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DAMAGES AND PROOF IN CASES OF
WRONGFUL DISHONOR: THE
UNSETTLED ISSUES UNDER
U.C.C. SECTION 4-402
STEVEN B. DOW*
The checking account is a legal arrangement between a bank and its
customer' in which the bank promises to pay items (checks) drawn by
the customer according to the terms of the checking account contract.2
A bank's refusal to pay a customer's item makes it liable to the customer
if the refusal, which is referred to as a dishonor,3 was wrongful.4 Because
* Associate Professor of Business Law, Michigan State University; Member of the Ohio Bar.
The author wishes to thank Nan S. Ellis, Loyola College, Baltimore; and Arthur D. Wolfe, Michigan
State University, for their helpful comments on an early draft of this Article.
I. Currently many financial institutions that are not technically classified as banks, such as
credit unions and savings and loan institutions, offer services that are functionally equivalent to
checking accounts. In this Article all such institutions are referred to as "banks."
2. Under § 4-103(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) (all subsequent references are
to the 1978 Official Text), the parties have a considerable amount of flexibility with respect to the
terms of the checking account contract; however, § 4-103(1) also imposes significant limits on the
ability of a bank to disclaim certain statutory responsibilities.
3. Section 3-507(1) specifies that an instrument is dishonored when, "in case of bank collec-
tions the instrument is seasonally returned by the midnight deadline (§ 4-301)." U.C.C. § 3-507
(1978). Under many circumstances, however, a bank's refusal to pay an item does not constitute a
dishonor. A bank may refuse to pay an item because the payee's indorsement is missing, the
drawer's signature is illegible or forged, the date has been altered, or the date of a postdated check
has not arrived. See U.C.C. § 3-510, official comment 2; § 3-507(3) (1978).
4. Section 4-402 governs the liability of a bank for wrongfully dishonoring an item. It
provides:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused by the wrongful
dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to
actual damages proved. If so proximately caused and proved damages may include dam-
ages for an arrest or prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages. Whether
any consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrongful dishonor is a question
of fact to be determined in each case.
U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978).
Although this section does not specify what constitutes a wrongful dishonor, Official Comment 2
to § 4-402 specifies that it "excludes any permitted or justified dishonor." The typical case in which
dishonors are not wrongful is when the customer's balance is insufficient to pay the item. See, eg.,
McMichen v. Georgia State Bank, 148 Ga. App. 680, 252 S.E.2d 198 (1979). The insufficiency may
be due to the bank's proper exercise of a setoff against funds in the account, see Clairmont v. State
Bank, 295 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1980); Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Delp & Chapel Con-
crete and Constr. Co., 44 Md. App. 34, 408 A.2d 1043 (1980); or because the customer drew against
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a customer's action against a bank for wrongful dishonor lies at the heart
of the checking account relationship, it would seem likely that courts
would have firmly settled the legal issues surrounding this action. How-
ever, a review of the cases applying section 4-402 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.), the statutory basis of an action for wrongful
dishonor, shows that little agreement exists over even the most basic is-
sues. Section 4-402 has been and continues to be a generous source of
judicial confusion and scholarly debate.5
A number of distinct legal issues involved in a customer's action for
wrongful dishonor remain unsettled. This Article will focus on and ana-
lyze two of the most important of these issues. First, the Article will
discuss the types of losses or injuries for which the customer may obtain
credits that were not yet available for withdrawal, see Merchant v. Worley, 79 N.M. 771, 449 P.2d
787 (N.M. CL App. 1969).
In general, a wrongful dishonor is one in which the payor bank (defined in § 4-105(b) as the bank
on which the item is drawn) refuses to pay a properly drawn, indorsed and presented item when the
customer (drawer) has sufficient funds or credit in his account to pay the instrument. A wrongful
dishonor includes a dishonor by the payor bank due to insufficient funds in the customer's account
when the insufficiency is due to an improper act by the bank such as a wrongful setoff, hold, or
charge. See Yacht Club Sales and Service, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 623 P.2d 464
(1980) (wrongful hold on account); Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758
(1972) (wrongful setoff); Boggs v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 32 Md. App. 500, 363 A.2d 247
(1976) (improper chargeback).
A wrongful dishonor also includes dishonors in which the insufficiency is due to the failure of the
bank to credit a deposit to the customer's account. See, e.g., Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank of
Detroit, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Mich. Ct. C.P. 1974); Nealis v. Industrial Bank of
Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951). For a more detailed account of
what constitutes a wrongful dishonor, see Davenport, Wrongful Dishonor. UCC Section 4-402 and
the Trader Rule, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1117, 1119-1121 (1981) and Holland, An Analysis of the Legal
Problems Resulting From Wrongful Dishonors, 42 Mo. L. Rnv. 507, 508-516 (1977).
5. For the most recent commentary, see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 17-4 (2d ed. 1980); Daniels, Bank Liability for
Wrongful Dishonor. UCC Section 4-402-Is Revision Needed?, 8 IND. L. REv. 802 (1975); Daven-
port, supra note 4; Holland, supra note 4; Leibson, Wrongful Dishonor Under the UCC: A Trip
Through the Maze of 4-402, 8 AKRON L. REV. 317 (1975); Miller & Scott, Commercial Paper, Bank
Deposits and Collections and Commercial Electronic Fund Transfers, 38 Bus. LAW. 1129 (1983);
Sabbath, Drawee Bank's Liability for Wrongful Dishonor: A Proposed Checkholder Cause of Action,
58 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 318 (1984); Note, Punitive Damages For Wrongful Dishonor of a Check 28
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1971); Comment, Wrongful Dishonor of a Check- Payor Bank's Liability
Under Section 4-402, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 116 (1969); Comment, Right of Partnership to
Damages for Wrongfully Dishonoring Partnership Checks, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169 (1968). For
earlier commentary on wrongful dishonor under the common law and the statutory predecessor to
§ 4-402, see Huffeut, Liability of a Bank to the Maker of a Check for the Wrongful Dishonor Thereof,
2 COLUM. L. REv. 193 (1902); Note, Liability of Bank to Depositor for Wrongful Dishonor of Check,
29 MICH. L. REv. 208 (1930); Comment, The Measure of Damages for Wrongful Dishonor, 23 U.
CHI. L. REv. 481 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Measure of Damages].
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compensation in an action against a bank for wrongful dishonor under
section 4-402. Second, this Article will address the nature of the proof
required to recover such damages. In addressing these questions this Ar-
ticle will examine the nature of an action for wrongful dishonor both at
common law and under the statutory predecessor to section 4-402. It
will also examine various taxonomic problems as well as the origin of the
statutory language employed in the current version of section 4-402. Fi-
nally, it will discuss wrongful dishonor under section 4-402, and suggest
some approaches that would clarify and unify the current divergent ap-
proaches of the courts.
I. TAxoNoMIc PROBLEMS
A. The Nature of the Action
The confusion surrounding an action for wrongful dishonor was per-
haps inevitable given the debate that surrounded the common-law origins
of section 4-402 and its statutory predecessor. A customer's action
against a bank for wrongful dishonor has its roots in English common
law.6 The legal arrangement under which the bank promises to pay
items drawn by its customer is essentially one of contract; therefore,
courts viewed an action against the bank for failing to pay an item as a
contract action.7 Yet, it became apparent early in the development of the
action for wrongful dishonor that the failure of the bank to pay an item
was more than a mere breach of contract. The effect of the bank's failure
to pay an item went well beyond the effect of a failure to pay an ordinary
debt. The likely consequences of a dishonor included the imputation to
the customer of insolvency, dishonesty, and bad faith. Thus, the dis-
honor also constituted a tortious wrong as well as a breach of contract.
Courts found the tort akin to slander' and independent of the breach of
contract action.
In the United States, a major source of confusion in the development
of an action for wrongful dishonor was the ambivalence over the nature
of the action. Some courts, focusing on the contractual nature of the
bank/depositor relationship, viewed the action solely as a breach of con-
6. The early leading English decisions are Rolin v. Steward, 139 Eng. Rep. 245 (Ex. Ch. 1854)
and Marzetti v. Williams, 109 Eng. Rep. 842 (K.B. 1830).
7. Marzetti v. Williams, 109 Eng. Rep. 842, 845-46 (K.B. 1830).
8. Id. at 845; Rolin v. Steward, 139 Eng. Rep. 245, 249-50 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
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tract.9 Other courts viewed the action as one of tort. These courts em-
phasized the injury to the customer's credit standing and reputation in
the community. 0 However, prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., a ma-
jority of courts viewed an action for wrongful dishonor as based both on
contract and tort.1" After the adoption of the UCC a substantial shift
occurred. A review of wrongful dishonor cases that courts have decided
under section 4-402 shows that although the drafters expressly eschewed
any attempt to specify a theory,12 an overwhelming majority of courts
view the action wholly or in part based.upon tort.13 A few courts, how-
ever, continue to view the action as solely one of contract. 14 One court'5
took an unusual view, stating that the action was either contract or tort,
depending upon the nature of the dishonor in the particular case.1 6
This divergence in the courts' approach to the nature of the wrongful
dishonor action is.significant because the label of contract or tort carries
substantial doctrinal baggage. Attaching either label to the action for
wrongful dishonor entails the application of various substantive doctrines
9. See Wiley v. Bunker Hill Nat'l Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N.E. 655 (1903); First Nat'l Bank
v. English, 240 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
10. See, eg., Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896); Nealis v. Industrial
Bank of Commerce, 200 Misc. 406, 107 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951).
11. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942); Weaver v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963) (en banc);
Allen v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943);
Siminoffv. James H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 P. 939 (1912); Abramowitz v. Bank
of America, 131 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 892, 281 P.2d 380 (1955); Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549,
140 S.E. 150, 152 (1927). For a discussion of the two theories of recovery, see Daniels, supra note 5,
at 804-06; Davenport, supra note 4, at 1122-26; Huffcut, Liability of a Bank to the Maker of a Check
for the Wrongful Dishonor Thereof 2 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 195-97 (1902); Comment, The Measure
of Damages, supra note 5, at 483-90.
12. Section 4-402, official comment 2 states, in part, that "[this section does not attempt to
specify a theory."
13. See Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848
(1975); Yacht Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980);
Wright v. Commercial & Say. Bank, 297 Md. 148, 159 n.3, 464 A.2d 1080, 1086 n.3 (1983); Siegman
v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76
N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Luxonomy Cars, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 65 A.D.2d 549, 408
N.Y.S.2d 951 (1978); Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 640 P.2d 953 (Okla. 1981); Northshore
Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
14. See, ag., Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 384 Mass. 310, 424 N.E.2d 515 (1981).
15. Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968). See also First Nat'l Bank v.
Ducros, 27 Ala. App. 193, 168 So. 704, 705 (1936) (customer may elect to "sue for a breach of
contract or for the breach of duty arising therefrom").
16. Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1968).
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concerning damages and proof of injury. This Article will explore some
of these consequences below.
1. Contract Liability
One major consequence of attaching a contract label to an action for
wrongful dishonor is the limitations on damages under the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale.'7 A traditional application of Hadley would erect a nearly
insurmountable barrier to the recovery of other than nominal damages.
In First National Bank Y. English, 8 the defendant bank dishonored
plaintiff's checks for insufficient funds. The bank caused the insufficiency
by paying out of the customer's account two checks on which the cus-
tomer's signature had been forged. The customer was out of town at the
time of the error and incurred the expense of traveling to the bank to
straighten out the problem. The court denied recovery of reasonable
travel expenses because the customer failed to show that at the time the
bank accepted the customer's deposit, it could have foreseen either that it
would have paid checks with forged signatures or that the customer
would have to travel from New York to Texas to investigate the matter.
Even if a court misapplied Hadley and determined what consequences
the bank could have foreseen at the time of the dishonor instead of at the
time the customer opened the account the result would have been simi-
lar. In Wahrman v. Bronx County Trust Co., 9 for example, the defend-
ant bank's wrongful dishonor of the plaintiff's insurance premium check
resulted in cancellation of the plaintiff's accident and health insurance
policy. The court held that the customer could not recover special dam-
ages unless the customer proved that the bank had knowledge of the rea-
sonably foreseeable consequences of dishonoring the check. The court
further held that it would not infer the requisite knowledge from the
identity of the payee.2"
Under the contract approach, the rule in Hadley gives a court the abil-
ity to deny recovery of special damages in all but a few cases. On the
other hand, the rule is sufficiently flexible to permit a court, if it is so
inclined, to allow recovery of special damages in all but a few cases.2 ' In
17. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
18. 240 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
19, 246 A.D.2d 220, 285 N.Y.S. 312 (1936).
20. Id. at 221, 285 N.Y.S. at 313.
21. As Prosser points out, in "one sense, almost nothing is entirely unforeseeable" and in "an-
other [sense], no event whatever is entirely foreseeable. . ." W. KEETON, D. DoBas, R. KEETON,
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Roe v. Best,2 2 the defendant bank's dishonor of the customers' insurance
premium check resulted in the cancellation of their life insurance poli-
cies. Their insurer refused to reinstate the policies because of the cus-
tomers' ages. On the issues of foreseeability and special damages the
court indicated that employees of the bank knew that the check was pay-
able to an insurance company and added, "[i]t is a matter of common
knowledge that the failure to pay premiums on insurance policies will
cause forfeiture thereof."23  Thus, the very consequence that the
Wahrman24 court found not to be reasonably foreseeable, the Roe court
found to be common knowledge. These two cases cannot be explained as
varying interpretations of different sets of facts.
The limits on recovery of damages under Hadley have clearly been
relaxed25 in contract law generally as well as under U.C.C. Article 2 sales
law. Primarily because so few courts subscribe to the contract theory of
liability,26 it is difficult to detect whether there has been a similar liberali-
zation in wrongful dishonor cases. It appears, however, that in the area
of wrongful dishonor some liberalization has taken place.27
D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs 297 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]. Professor Dobbs states that the idea of foreseeability
is so readily subject to expansion or contraction that it becomes in fact merely a technical
way in which the judges can state their conclusion. Unless there is proof that the parties
specifically mentioned an item of damage in contracting, the judges are free to describe that
item as an unforeseeable one. Everyone might disagree, but no one could prove the judges
wrong, since the question is not one that can be resolved by a scientific test. Thus, what
sounds like a reason for a judicial result may only be a special, symbolic way of expressing
the judicial preference arrived at on grounds altogether removed from "foreseeability."
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDIES 814, 803-10, 812-17 (1973). See also G. GIL-
MORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcT 49-53, 83-85 (1974).
22. 120 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Roe was decided two years after Wahrman, 246
A.D.2d 220, 285 N.Y.S. 312 (1936), discussed supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
23. 120 S.W.2d at 822.
24. Wahrman v. Bronx County Trust Co., 246 A.D.2d 220, 285 N.Y.S. 312 (1936). See supra
text accompanying notes 19-20.
25. See Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971); Krauss v. Greenbarg, 137 F.2d
569 (3d Cir. 1943); Scott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951); Nat'l Farmers Org., Inc.
v. McCook Feed & Supply Co., 196 Neb. 424, 243 N.W.2d 335 (1976); Sol-O-Lite Laminating Corp.
v. Allen, 233 Or. 80, 353 P.2d 843 (1960); RI. Lampus Co. v. Neville Cement Prod. Corp., 474 Pa.
199, 378 A.2d 288 (1977); Dennis v. Southworth, 2 Wash. App. 115, 467 P.2d 330 (1970). See also J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at § 10-4; D. DOBBS, supra note 21, at 158, 805-07, 812-14; G.
GILMORE, supra note 21, at 49-53, 83-84.
26. See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
27. Compare Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968) (customer could not
recover for nerve problems and subsequent loss of work as these problems were not foreseeable) with
Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 380 P.2d 644,
(1963) (under contract approach the arrest of the customer may be within the reasonable contempla-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss2/3
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Attaching a contract label to an action for wrongful dishonor also
caused some courts to view a dishonor as simply a failure to pay a liqui-
dated sum. This view was based on the generally accepted notion that
the legal relationship between the depositor and the bank is essentially
one of debtor and creditor.2" Ordinarily, common law or a statute limits
a debtor's liability for failure to pay a debt to the amount of the debt plus
interest.29 Under this approach, the dishonor of a check was simply a
refusal by the bank (the debtor) to pay a liquidated sum to the customer
(the creditor) and courts therefore limited the damages to the amount of
the check plus interest. Although California courts accepted this view
for a short time,3" most other courts rejected it.3" One court rejected this
limited view, because the "effect upon the depositor of the refusal of the
bank to pay upon his order goes far beyond the effect of such a failure to
pay by an ordinary debtor."32 Because the refusal entails the imputation
of insolvency, wrongdoing, and dishonesty on the customer's part, most
courts viewed the liquidated sum rule as an inadequate measure of dam-
ages for wrongful dishonor.33
Courts deciding wrongful dishonor cases under the U.C.C. have repu-
diated the liquidated sum rule. The extent of this repudiation is evident
when the bank dishonors a check that the drawer rather than a third
tion of the parties). See also Raymer v. Bay State Natl Bank, 384 Mass. 310, 317-18, 424 N.E.2d
515, 520 (Mass. 1981) (to recover consequential damages for financial loss the customer must show
that such loss was caused by the wrongful dishonor rather than show that such loss was foreseeable).
28. See, eg., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491,499, 121 P.2d 414,418 (1942); Siminoff
v. James H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 12, 121 P. 939, 942-943 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1912); Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 551, 140 S.E. 150, 152 (1927).
29. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 499, 121 P.2d 414, 418 (1942); Siminoffv.
James H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 14, 121 P. 939, 943 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912);
Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 552, 140 S.E. 150, 152 (1927). See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3302
(Deering 1984) (damage due to breach of obligation to pay money is measured by amount due plus
interest).
30. See Hartford v. All Night & Day Bank, 170 Cal. 538, 540-41, 150 P. 356, 357 (1915). See
also Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644 (1963)
(overruling Hartford holding that damages are limited to amount of check plus damages).
31. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 121 P.2d 414 (1942); Weaver v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 52 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644 (1963); Siminoff v. James H.
Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 P. 939 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1912); Wiley v. Bunker Hill
Nat'l Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N.E. 655, 656 (1903); Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E.
150, 152 (1927).
32. 58 Ariz. at 499, 121 P.2d at 418.
33. Some courts allowed the plaintiff the option of suing in contract for the amount of the
check plus interest, or suing in tort. See, eg., id at 499, 121 P.2d at 418.
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party holder presented.34 In this situation, no imputation of insolvency
or wrongdoing is possible because no one other than the customer had
knowledge of the dishonor and the only practical consequence of the dis-
honor was to make the funds unavailable to the customer. Courts have
nevertheless sustained the recovery of substantial compensatory damages
unrelated to the amount of the check.35 Courts refuse to consider the
dishonor in this type of case as merely a breach of contract involving the
failure to pay money according to the terms of the checking or savings
account contract.
2. Tort Liability and the Trader Rule
Those courts that wholly or partially subscribed to a tort theory of
recovery36 linked wrongful dishonor to the law of defamation. Although
this association has become increasingly less important due to the enact-
ment of section 4-402 and the recent movement toward a general theory
of tort liability for wrongful dishonor, 7 the law of defamation has made
an indelible imprint on the substantive law of wrongful dishonor. Not
surprisingly, this impact has been a confusing one due to the chaotic state
of the law of defamation. Prosser confesses that "there is a great deal of
the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and
absurdities for which no legal writer ever has a kind word."3 These
anomalies and absurdities have, for the most part, been foisted onto an
action for wrongful dishonor with unsettled results.
Recognizing the likely consequences of a bank's failure to pay an
item,39 courts in the early wrongful dishonor cases viewed the action as
analogous to common-law slander.4' Under this view, a customer could
34. Courts have repudiated the rule in third party holder cases as well. See, e.g., Raymer v.
Bay State Nat'l Bank, 384 Mass. 310, 317-18, 424 N.E.2d 515, 520 (1981).
35. See, eg., Hooper v. Bank of New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1369 (Bankr.. E.D. Pa. 1980) (trustee in bankruptcy presented checks drawn on debtor
account knowing that account had insufficient funds); Joler v. Depositors Trust Co., 309 A.2d 871,
876-77 (Me. 1973) (§ 4-402 applied to attempted withdrawal from savings account); Shaw v. Union
Bank & Trust Co., 640 P.2d 953, 955-57 (Okla. 1981) (§ 4-402 applied to attempted withdrawal
from savings account). See also Wallick v. First State Bank of Farmington, 532 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976) (§ 4-402 applied to attempted withdrawal from special quasi-escrow account by account
owner's spouse).
36. See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
38. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 771.
39. See supra text accompanying note 8.
40. See cases cited supra notes 6-8.
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not recover damages merely upon proof of the wrongful dishonor. The
customer had to allege and prove special damages before the court would
allow substantial damages.4 The requirement that special damages had
to be pecuniary provided another obstacle to recovery. The customer
could only recover damages for injury to his reputation and feelings after
he had established pecuniary loss. 42
On the other hand, if the customer was a merchant or trader, the
courts viewed a wrongful dishonor as analogous to slander of a person in
his trade, which called for different substantive rules. At common law,
when a defendant slandered a person in his trade or profession the plain-
tiff could recover damages without proof of any actual loss, pecuniary or
otherwise.43 Prosser indicates that while this exception to the general
rule requiring proof of pecuniary losses in slander cases has an obscure
origin, courts probably dispensed with the requirement because they rec-
ognized the likelihood of pecuniary loss in these cases.4 Thus, when the
customer was a trader he could recover substantial damages for wrongful
dishonor without proof of special damages.45 All the customer must es-
tablish is his status as a trader and the existence of the wrongful dis-
honor. This rule became known as the "Trader Rule."46 Nearly all
courts in this country adopted this rule.47
An important impetus behind the acceptance of the Trader Rule was
the courts' recognition of the vital importance of a customer's credit
standing within the community, the ease with which a wrongful dishonor
can damage a person's credit standing, and the difficulty in many cases of
proving special damages.48 The courts found these problems particularly
41. Rolin v. Steward, 139 Eng. Rep. 245, 250 (1854). In other words, general damages were
not available merely upon proof of the wrongful dishonor.
42. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 793-95. "Pecuniary" loss or injury is a term Prosser used to
describe loss of money or of something that could generate money as opposed to mental and emo-
tional injury. The requirement of proof of pecuniary loss grew out of an early jurisdictional dispute
between the common law courts and the ecclesiastical courts. See Comment, The Measure of Dam-
ages, supra note 5, at 489 n.39. This impediment to the recovery of nonpecuniary loss developed into
a prohibition of the recovery of damages for nonpecuniary losses in some wrongful dishonor cases.
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
43. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 791, 793-95.
44. Id. at 791.
45. Rolin v. Steward, 139 Eng. Rep. 245, 250 (1854).
46. For a discussion of the origin and development of the Trader Rule, see Daniels, supra note
5, at 806-10; and Davenport, supra note 4, at 1122-30.
47. Some American courts significantly modified the Trader Rule. See, e.g., Wildenberger v.
Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921).
48. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491,498-502, 121 P.2d 414,418-19 (1942); Schaff-
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acute when the customer was engaged in a trade or business; hence the
courts were receptive to the Trader Rule. Eventually the courts extended
the Trader Rule to encompass any "businessman." 49 Modem financial
practices, which made nonmerchants as heavily dependent upon the
availability of credit as merchants, prompted some courts to extend the
availability of the Trader Rule presumption to all customers.50
The Trader Rule also rested on the related view that banks are quasi-
public institutions.51 Notwithstanding that the checking account rela-
tionship is initially a private contractual one, the vital role banks play in
the business of a community justified the imposition of this tort-like rem-
edy as a matter of public policy. 2 This approach makes available the
presumption of damages to trader and nontrader alike.
In summary, attaching a tort label to an action for wrongful dishonor
developed a link to the law of defamation, and in particular the law of
slander. One product of this association was the Trader Rule. 3 The
judicial expansion of the Trader Rule eventually prompted measures to
curtail its application. The most significant of these was a model statute
that the American Banking Association (ABA) drafted in 1914.
B. The American Banking Association Model Statute and the Concept
of Mistake
Despite the general acceptance and expansion of the Trader Rule, it
generated significant dissatisfaction among bankers and some courts.5 4
The bankers' dissatisfaction manifested itself in the form of a model stat-
ner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 113, 28 N.E. 917, 919 (1891); Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 42,
65 N.W. 1086, 1087 (1896); Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927); Bush v.
Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1926).
49. See, e-g., Peabody v. Citizens' State Bank, 98 Minn. 302, 108 N.W. 272 (1906).
50. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 500-02, 121 P.2d 414, 418-19 (1942); Atlanta
Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 336-37, 23 S.E. 190, 190-91 (1895); Granada Bank v. Lester, 126
Miss. 442, 444, 89 So. 2, 3 (1921); Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 554, 140 S.E. 150, 153
(1927); Lorick v. Palmetto Bank & Trust Co., 74 S.C. 185, 187, 54 S.E. 206, 206 (1906).
51. Patterson v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 A. 632 (1889).
52. Id. at 433, 18 A. at 633.
53. It should be noted that both the contract and the tort theory of liability for wrongful dis-
honor could accommodate the Trader Rule, although the courts had to couch it in the appropriate
doctrinal terminology. See Wiley v. Bunker Hill Nat'l Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 496, 67 N.E. 655, 656
(1903) (Trader Rule available in a contract action for wrongful dishonor); supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text.
54. See, eg., Love v. Tioga Trust Co., 68 Pa. Super. 447 (1917) (dictum). See also Bush v.
Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27, 28 (1926) (discussing the dissatisfaction with the Trader
Rule prevalent before the ABA Statute).
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ute, which the ABA drafted in 1914. This statute provided that with
respect to an action for wrongful dishonor:
No bank or trust company doing business in this state shall be liable to a
depositor because of the non-payment through mistake or error and with-
out malice of a check which should have been paid unless the depositor
shall allege and prove actual damage by reason of such non-payment and in
such event the liability shall not exceed the amount of damage so proved.55
Twenty-four states enacted this statute or a modified form of it.56
Although the motivation behind the adoption of the ABA Statute in
these jurisdictions is obscure,57 the motivation of the ABA in drafting it
is clear. The statute was an attempt to lessen the potential liability of
banks by abolishing the Trader Rule in cases of dishonor arising from
mistake or error.5" The bankers argued that the assumption underlying
the Trader Rule was not realistic. Further, they argued that the rule
leads to harsh and unjust results because in a majority of mistaken dis-
honor cases the customer suffers no actual damage.59 The ABA Statute
was only partially successful in abolishing the Trader Rule; moreover, a
great deal of judicial uncertainty arose over the scope of its application.'
The ABA Statute had a considerable impact on the development of an
action for wrongful dishonor. The most significant change the model
statute brought about in the law of wrongful dishonor was the distinction
it drew between mistaken and nonmistaken dishonors. This distinction is
one of the most curious features of the statute. A review of wrongful
55. T. PATON, DIGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS § 21B:1 at 1117-18 (4th ed. 1940).
56. These were: Alabama, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. See I T. PATON, supra note 55, at § 21B:I.
57. Undoubtedly the influence of the banking lobby in the state legislatures was a significant
factor in the adoption of the statute.
58. See I T. PATON, supra note 55, at § 21B:1. Some dispute exists on the intended scope of the
statute. William Davenport argues that the "thrust of the ABA model statute was the total elimina-
tion of the trader rule," Davenport, supra note 4, at 1136 n.105. Earlier in the same article, however,
he states that "the primary purpose of the ABA Statute was the elimination of the trader rule in its
most unjust application--cases of negligent dishonor." Id. at 1134. Given the language of the ABA
Statute ("through mistake or error and without malice . . ."), and a statement the ABA issued
justifying the statute, it is apparent that the intent of drafters was to limit the liability of banks only
in cases of mistaken wrongful dishonor. Other commentators concur. See Daniels, supra note 5, at
811; Holland, supra note 4, at 518-19; Comment, The Measure of Damages, supra note 5, at 489
n.38.
59. 1 T. PATON, supra note 55, at § 21B:I.
60. Not surprisingly, this confusion found its way into wrongful dishonor cases under § 4-402
largely because the drafters based § 4-402, in part, on the ABA Statute.
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dishonor cases at common law demonstrates that the courts did not util-
ize such a distinction.61  The courts often did not classify the dishonors
as mistaken or nonmistaken.62 When courts did classify the type of dis-
honor, the classification did not affect the liability of the bank.63 In most
jurisdictions the bank's liability was the same whether the wrongful dis-
honor was mistaken or not,' and the Trader Rule was available in both
types of cases.65
The mistake/nonmistake distinction employed by the ABA Statute is
anomalous not only because of its absence from common-law wrongful
dishonor cases, but also because of its absence from general principles of
tort and contract liability. Liability for breach of contract does not de-
pend on whether or not the breach was intentional.6 6 Under the law of
defamation the defendant is strictly liable.67 The lack of support for the
61. See Siminoffv. James H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 P. 939 (1912); Atlanta
Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895); Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Il. 109, 28 N.E. 917
(1891); Wiley v. Bunker Hill Nat'l Bank, 183 Mass 495, 67 N.E. 655 (1903); Svendsen v. State Bank,
64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896); Patterson v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 A. 632 (1889);
Lorick v. Palmetto Bank & Trust Co., 74 S.C. 185, 54 S.E. 206 (1906).
62. See, eg., Siminoffv. James H. Goodman & Co. Bank, 18 Cal. App. 5, 121 P. 939 (1912);
Wiley v. Bunker Hill Nat'l Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N.E. 655 (1903).
63. See, eg., Atlanta Natl Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 23 S.E. 190 (1895); Schaffner v. Ehrman,
139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891); Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896); Lorick
v. Palmetto Bank & Trust Co., 74 S.C. 185, 54 S.E. 206 (1906). The courts appear to focus more on
the consequences of the dishonor than on its nature:
The check was returned unpaid. It seems clear from the evidence that this was done, not
deliberately or maliciously, but in consequence of a mistake made by one of the employees
of the bank. The paper was not protested or willfully dishonored. Still, so far as the plain-
tiff is concerned, we think what occurred amounted to a refusal to pay his check. The
consequences to him, resulting from the inadvertence of the bank official, were exactly the
same as it there had been an express refusal to pay.
Atlanta Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 96 Ga. 334, 334, 23 S.E. 190, 190 (1895).
64. See cases cited supra notes 61-63. A notable exception was New York where the bank's
liability in cases of mistaken dishonor was limited to nominal damages. See, e.g., Wildenberger v.
Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921).
Significantly, some courts employed a distinction between malicious and nonmalicious dishonors.
This distinction, however, had no impact on proof, the availability of the Trader Rule, or the bank's
liability in general. It did have an impact on the availability of damages for mental distress and
humiliation. See, eg., Valley Nat'1 Bank v. Witter, 58 Ariz. 491, 505, 121 P.2d 414, 420 (1942). It
also had an impact on the availability of punitive damages. See Note, Punitive Damages for Wrong-
ful Dishonor of a Check, supra note 5.
65. See cases cited supra notes 61-63.
66. In general, the only effect that the nature of the breach has on the liability of the breaching
party is to allow the plaintiff to recover damages for mental suffering under some circumstances. See
5 A. CORBIN, A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW § 1076
(1964).
67. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 802-04, 808-810. Except as to the element of publication to a
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mistake/nonmistake distinction in the common law or in principles of
contract or tort liability, and the disapproval of the distinction by com-
mentators68 raise the question as to why the ABA included the distinc-
tion in its model statute.69
It is submitted that the mistake/nonmistake distinction is not the
product of sophisticated legal theory or historical analysis; rather, it is
the product of political expediency. Presumably, the ABA would have
preferred to eliminate the Trader Rule altogether. However, it is also
likely that the ABA believed that the chances of states adopting the
model statute would be better if the model statute aimed at those applica-
tions of the Trader Rule that might be perceived by state legislatures as
most unjust-dishonor through mistake or error. It would not have been
politically expedient to confer an advantage on banks even when they
intentionally and wrongfully dishonored a customer's item. After all, de-
spite the dissatisfaction with the Trader Rule on the part of bankers and
some courts, 70 the rule was popular with nonbanking interests; its wide-
spread adoption and expansion to nontraders demonstrates this.7 While
courts in some states that adopted the ABA Statute accepted the mis-
take/nonmistake distinction,72 other courts did not.73 The distinction
third party, the defendant is held responsible for purely innocent defamatory conduct; however,
matters of belief and intent are relevant with respect to the issues of qualified privilege and the
availability of punitive damages. Id. Except for the availability of punitive damages, a defendant's
liability in tort usually does not depend on whether the defendant's conduct is intentional or negli-
gent once courts have determined that the particular legal interest deserves protection and redress.
68. Davenport, supra note 4, at 1130-39; Comment, The Measure of Damages, supra note 5, at
489 n.38. Cf Holland, Legal Problems, supra note 4, at 526 (arguing that § 4-402 "should be re-
drafted to preclude a presumption of injury in mistaken dishonor cases." Id. at 540); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, at § 17-4 (distinguishing between willful and mistaken dishonors).
69. Again, some would argue that the thrust of the ABA Statute was to eliminate entirely the
Trader Rule, see supra note 58. It seems obvious, however, that if the drafters had intended that the
model statute abolish the Trader Rule in all cases, they would have chosen language to that effect.
70. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 45-50. For a discussion of the development and expansion of the Trader
Rule in the United States, see Davenport, supra note 4, at 1126-29; and Daniels, supra note 5, at 809-
10.
72 See, e.g., Woody v. Nat'l Bank, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927); see also Jones v. Citizens
Bank, 58 N.M. 48, 265 P.2d 366 (1954) (court acknowledged the distinction but because of the jury's
finding of malice, the court did not need to characterize the dishonor as mistaken or not). A finding
that a dishonor was nonmistaken does not necessarily entail the finding of actual malice. Some
courts found legal malice, in the sense of a wrongful act done intentionally and without just cause or
excuse, sufficient to warrant the presumption of damages. See 58 N.M. at 51, 265 P.2d at 368.
73. See First Nat'l Bank v. Ducros, 27 Ala. App. 193, 168 So. 704 (1936); Waggoner v. Bank of
Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165, 281 S.W. 130 (1926); Bush v. Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27
(1924). The only distinction the courts drew was between malicious and nonmalicious dishonors.
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has,however, become firmly established in the law of wrongful dishonor.
One of the leading cases on this issue is Wildenberger v. Ridgewood
National Bank.74 In Wildenberger, the bank dishonored the customer's
checks because of a hold it had placed on the account. The hold arose
out of a claim the customer's wife made to the funds in the account.
Writing for the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Cardozo held that
there was nothing accidental or mistaken in the bank's dishonor of these
checks. Rather, it was a "deliberate and willful" act done with knowl-
edge of the state of the account and the potential risks arising from
claims by both parties. Under Justice Cardozo's approach, a "mistaken"
dishonor is generally limited to instances of clerical and other bookkeep-
ing errors. It does not encompass intentional acts based on a misunder-
standing of the legal rights of the bank, the customer, and third parties.
In particular, a "mistaken" dishonor does not include a bank's mistaken
belief that it has the legal right to hold or setoff funds in the plaintiff's
account." Under this view, a mistaken dishonor might be described as a
mistake of fact; a dishonor based on a mistake of law is a nonmistaken or
intentional dishonor.
C. Types of Dishonors Under Section 4-402
The drafters of the U.C.C. incorporated the concept of mistake into
section 4-402. Section 4-402 provides, in part, that "[w]hen the dishonor
occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual damages proved."
The existence of such a distinction is not always clear, however, because the courts often did not
specify whether the malice necessary was actual or legal malice. Legal malice requires only a show-
ing of a wrongful act done intentionally and without justification or excuse. Thus, when a court
utilizes the legal definition of malice in its classification, it has, in affect, distinguished between mis-
taken and nonmistaken dishonors. See Jones v. Citizens Bank, 58 N.M. 48, 51, 265 P.2d 366, 368
(1954).
74. 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921). It is surprising that Wildenberger would prove to be a
leading case on the issue of mistake because New York had not enacted an ABA Statute. Neverthe-
less, the nature of a "mistake" was critical in Wildenberger because of the New York rule which held
that "the liability [of the payor bank] is for nominal damages and no more, if the dishonor of the
checks is the result of innocent mistake." Id. at 427-28, 130 N.E. at 600. The New York rule was
much less favorable toward plaintiffs than the ABA Statute. Under the ABA Statute courts denied
customers the presumption of damages in a case of mistaken dishonor, but customers could still
recover damages they alleged and proved. Under the New York rule the courts denied customers all
recovery (other than nominal damages) for mistaken dishonors. A court wishing to ameliorate the
harshness of this rule would interpret the concept of mistake very narrowly to limit the number of
cases in which the rule would apply. This appears to be what happened in the Wildenberger case.
75. Under Wildenberger then, the court need not find malice for it to find a nonmistaken dis-
honor. A nonmistaken dishonor can be both malicious and nonmalicious. See supra note 71.
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Courts deciding cases under section 4-402 generally follow the
Wildenberger76 definition of mistake.77 The Wildenberger court limited
mistaken dishonors to clerical and other bookkeeping errors and ex-
cluded mistakes of law. A few courts, however, when confronted with a
case where a bank has improperly placed a hold on an account or im-
properly exercised a setoff, view the resulting dishonor as mistaken.78
Not all courts utilize the mistake/nonmistake distinction. A few courts
76. Wildenberger v. Ridgewood Nat'l Bank, 230 N.Y. 425, 130 N.E. 600 (1921); see supra notes
74-75 and accompanying text.
77. See Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982); Yacht
Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980); Raymer v. Bay
State Nat'l Bank, 384 Mass. 310,424 N.E.2d 515 (1981); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Fergu-
son, 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981); see supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Continental Bank v. Fitting, 114 Ariz. 98, 559 P.2d 218 (1977); First Nat'l Bank v.
Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
The difficulties courts encounter when classifying types of wrongful dishonors are readily apparent
when the courts confront the issue of punitive damages. The availability of punitive damages largely
depends upon the nature of the dishonor. Punitive damages are not available in cases of mistaken
dishonor. See, eg., Hooper v. Bank of New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1369, 1375 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50
Cal. App. 3d 949, 958-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848, 854 (1975); Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md.
309, 313-16, 297 A.2d 758, 760-61 (1972). In a case of nonmistaken wrongful dishonor, punitive
damages may be available, depending on the nature of the nonmistaken dishonor. Most courts
would allow the recovery of punitive damages when there is evidence that the dishonor was mali-
cious, oppressive, in reckless disregard of the customer's rights, or motivated by fraud. See, eg.,
Hooper v. Bank of New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1369
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123
Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975); Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Harvey v.
Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Mich. Ct. C.P. 1974); Loucks v. Albu-
querque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust, 640 P.2d 953
(Okla. 1981). But see Wallick v. First State Bank, 532 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). There is,
however, some dispute over whether this kind of dishonor constitutes a third distinct classification of
dishonor, or is merely a description of a type of nonmistaken dishonor. See Allison v. First Nat'l
Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (N.M. Ct. App.), rev'd on othergrounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30
(1973).
On the other hand, a review of the dishonor cases involving wrongful setoff, when the bank's
conduct is motivated by a reckless disregard of the customer's rights, demonstrates that courts typi-
cally require the customer to offer evidence of something more than reckless disregard of his rights
before they award punitive damages. See, eg., Hooper v. Bank of New Jersey (In re Brandywine
Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1369 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Siegman v. Equitable Trust
Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972). The fact that some courts treat a dishonor triggered by a
wrongful setoff as a mistaken dishonor further complicates the matter, because punitive damages are
not available in cases of mistaken dishonor. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978). In addition, some courts hold that an intentional or willful dishonor merely
allows the recovery of damages for mental anguish, not punitive damages. See, eg., Bank of Louis-
ville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. 1968); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson,
617 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1981).
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determine what damages are appropriate without specifying whether or
not the dishonor was mistaken.7 9 One court's unusual approach rejects
the mistake/nonmistake distinction and instead defines mistake under
section 4-402 using the concept of the good faith requirement of section
2-103(1)(b).80
While uniform construction of the U.C.C. is desirable as a matter of
policy,"1 there remains the question whether the lack of uniformity on
the definition of mistake is cause for concern. The importance of uni-
formity depends upon the substantive or procedural significance that is
or ought to be attached to the determination that a dishonor was mis-
taken or not. If the availability of certain types of damages and the na-
ture of proof required are dependent upon the character of the dishonor,
courts should endeavor to apply uniform definitions and to specify
whether the dishonor is mistaken or not. On the other hand, if the avail-
ability of types of damages and requirements of proof are not dependent
upon the nature of the dishonor, then the lack of uniformity has little
significance.
II. DAMAGES AND PROOF IN PRE-CODE CASEs82
A. The Concept of Actual Damages
As noted, one significant aspect of the impact of the ABA Statute on
the development of an action for wrongful dishonor was its introduction
of the concept of mistake.83 Another aspect of the ABA Statute, one that
is perhaps more troubling, is its reference to "actual damage." The in-
tent of the drafters of the ABA Statute was to abolish the presumption of
substantial damages under the Trader Rule in cases of mistaken dis-
honor.8" There is no indication that the drafters intended to limit or
79. See, eg., American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 146 Ind. App. 122, 252
N.E.2d 839 (1969).
At least one commentator argues that the mistake/nonmistake distinction should be abolished in
favor of a distinction based on the presence or absence of malice. Damages and proof would be
identical in both malicious and nonmalicious dishonors, but punitive damages would be permissible
in cases of malicious dishonor. Davenport, supra note 4, at 1137-40.
80. Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376-77 (5th Cir. 1980).
81. For a discussion of uniformity in construction of the U.C.C., see the Official Comments to
U.C.C. § 1-102, and Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185
(1976).
82. "Pre-Code" cases include those decided under the ABA Statute as well as those decided
prior to its adoption. The focus in this section, however, is on cases decided under the ABA Statute.
83. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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expand the types of injuries or losses for which a court could award com-
pensation to a customer in an action for wrongful dishonor. The statute
was clearly directed at issues of proof. However, following the adoption
of the ABA Statute by numerous jurisdictions, 5 a subtle process began
in which courts concluded that the ABA Statute embodied substantive
changes in the types of losses or injuries for which a customer could
recover damages in an action for wrongful dishonor. This process re-
volved around courts' interpretation of the phrase "actual damage."
The confusion generated by this phrase found its way into wrongful
dishonor cases decided under section 4-402. This occurred because the
language of section 4-402 is partially based on the language of the ABA
Statute, and because the poor drafting of section 4-402 created its own
ambiguities.
The ABA Statute provided that in cases of mistaken dishonor the de-
positor must "allege and prove actual damage" and that the bank's liabil-
ity "shall not exceed the amount of damage so proved."86 Courts
imposed two different interpretations on this language. The first inter-
pretation, which is consistent with the drafters' intent to address only
matters of proof,87 limits the liability of the bank in cases of mistaken
dishonor to damages the customer actually proves.8 8 Under this view the
ABA Statute modified the Trader Rule, but brought about no changes
from the common law in the types of injuries or losses that could be
compensated in an action for wrongful dishonor. For example, in Bush
v. Southwark National Bank89 the court held that the words "actual
damage" in the ABA Statute have the same meaning as the words "ac-
tual damage" in common-law defamation.' Since "actual damage" in
common-law defamation was synonymous with pecuniary damage,9" this
had the effect of perpetuating the common-law restrictions on the recov-
ery of nonpecuniary losses. Under this first interpretation, courts denied
recovery to customers for loss or denial of credit unless the customer
85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
88. In this first interpretation, the word "actual" is used in the sense of "real" or "genuine" and
its effect is to eliminate the Trader Rule in cases of mistaken wrongful dishonor by requiring that in
this type of case, the customer prove all damages he wishes to recover.
89. 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1927).
90. Id. at 28.
91. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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could show that the denial caused a specific financial loss.92
The second interpretation limits the liability of the bank in cases of
mistaken dishonor to actual damages proved by the customer. 93 Under
this view courts interpret "actual damage" as a distinct concept of dam-
ages, which may entail a substantive limitation or expansion on the scope
of recovery available in a case of mistaken dishonor. Therefore, under
the second interpretation, the ABA Statute had two distinct effects. The
first effect was to limit the availability of the Trader Rule. The second
effect was to limit or expand the types of injuries or losses the customer
could recover. 94
An example of this second interpretation is found in Mouse v. Central
Savings & Trust Co. 9' In Mouse, the bank mistakenly dishonored one of
its customer's checks.96 The payee of the checks, after checking with the
bank, filed an affidavit with the police charging the customer with issuing
bad checks. Based on this affidavit the customer was arrested and placed
in jail until released on bond. One issue in Mouse was whether the arrest,
the confinement in jail, and the accompanying humiliation constituted
"actual damage" under the ABA Statute. The court held that the legis-
lature did not intend to deprive a customer of an action for mistaken
wrongful dishonor. Instead, the court determined that the purpose of the
statute was to prohibit the presumption of damages and the recovery of
punitive damages in this type of case. The court then held that
"'[a]ctual damages' is a term synonymous with compensatory damages,
and covers all loss recoverable as a matter of right."97 The court viewed
"actual damages" as "real" damages or damages "existing in fact," in
contradistinction to punitive damages. On the question of whether the
plaintiff's injuries and losses constituted actual damages, the court stated
that the customer's damage was "so real, present, and existing, in fact,
that the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical liberty of an-
92. See, eg., State Bank v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 569-71, 260 S.W. 431, 432 (1924) (court's
interpretation of variation of ABA Statute); Bush v. Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27, 28
(1927). See also Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 436, 380 P.2d
644, 650, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 10 (1963).
93. In this second interpretation, the word "actual" is used in the sense of "concrete" or "tangi-
ble" and suggests that the customer cannot recover some types of damages even if he is able to prove
them.
94. A similar situation exists with respect to the interpretation of U.C.C. § 4-402. See supra
notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
95. 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929).
96. Id. at 601, 167 N.E. at 868.
97. Id. at 610, 167 N.E. at 871.
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other gives rise to a cause of action all its own, namely, that of false
arrest."9 The Mouse court was not concerned with matters of proof.
The existence of injury here was not in question; rather the issue was
whether the customer's injury was compensable under the concept of
"actual damages."
The Mouse opinion is significant because it represents an expansion of
the scope of a customer's recovery over that available at common law.
The customer in Mouse proved only nonpecuniary injury, even though
that injury was substantial. If the defamation did not fall into one of the
categories of slander that was actionable without proof of damage, the
customer could not recover at common law unless he first established
pecuniary loss.99 Because the plaintiff in Mouse was not a merchant or
trader, a recovery of general damages for the arrest and prosecution rep-
resents a significant expansion over the scope of recovery available at
common law.
According to the Mouse court, one purpose of the ABA Statute was to
prohibit any presumption of damages for mistaken dishonor. To the ex-
tent that the ABA Statute abolished the presumption of damages pro-
vided by the Trader Rule, it also presented those courts that subscribed
to the slander analogy of wrongful dishonor with the question of how to
treat the common-law requirement of proving pecuniary loss. If the
Trader Rule presumption resulted in an injustice to the bank by relieving
the customer of the necessity of proving any damage at all, then abolish-
ing that presumption while at the same time retaining the common-law
requirement of proving pecuniary loss would clearly perpetrate an injus-
tice on the customer.1"° This is especially true when the injury is only to
the customer's dignitary interests. By allowing the customer to recover
substantial compensatory damages for proven nonpecuniary injury with-
out initially establishing pecuniary loss, the Mouse court apparently rec-
ognized that an amelioration of the specific requirements of proof borne
by the plaintiff at common law must accompany the abolition of the
98. Id. at 611, 167 N.E. at 871.
99. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. See also Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 436, 380 P.2d 644, 650, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 10 (1963).
100. The courts recognized the injustice that the ABA Statute might perpetrate. In Bush v.
Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1924), the court stated that "[t]he policy of the [ABA
Statute] is open to question;. . recovery can seldom be had because in most cases proof of actual
damage is impossible." Id. at 28. The Bush court subscribed to the slander analogy of liability. See
also Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428,437, 380 P.2d 644, 651, 30
Cal. Rptr. 4, 100 (1963); Comment, The Measure of Damages, supra note 5, at 488-89.
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Trader Rule.10 In doing so, the Mouse court took a significant step to-
ward removing the trappings of common-law slander from an action for
wrongful dishonor and expanding the scope of recovery by moving to-
ward a general theory of tort liability.
Weaver v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,102 a
California case decided more than thirty years after Mouse, confirmed
this movement. In Weaver, the Supreme Court of California confronted
facts similar to those in Mouse. The defendant bank wrongfully dishon-
ored the plaintiff's check. After the bank returned the check to the
payee, the payee swore out a warrant for the customer's arrest. The cus-
tomer was arrested, charged, and temporarily held in jail."0 3 On the issue
of whether the injuries to the customer's dignitary interests incident to
the arrest and confinement constituted "actual damage" under the ABA
Statute, the court adopted the Mouse court's analysis and conclusion.
The Weaver court stated that allowing compensation for the plaintiff's
nonpecuniary losses was consistent with the apparent purpose of the
ABA Statute. Moreover, such compensation was necessary following the
abolition of the Trader Rule presumption of damages to avoid inflicting
an injustice upon the depositor."° Thus, the Weaver court interpreted
"actual damages" under the ABA Statute as a distinct concept of dam-
ages. Following the Mouse court, the Weaver court interpreted the term
"actual" damages in the sense of "real" damages.105
Abramowitz v. Bank of America 06 provides another indication of the
movement away from a common-law defamation theory and toward a
theory of general tort liability in wrongful dishonor actions. In
Abramowitz, the customer wrote a check as a monthly installment under
a conditional sales contract for his automobile. The bank wrongfully dis-
honored the check and the seller repossessed the automobile pursuant to
the sales contract. The court noted that while the relationship between
the bank and the customer initially arose out of contract, the customer's
101. This amelioration did not come in the form of dispensing with the requirement of proving
nonpecuniary injury. Instead, the court allowed the recovery of damages for nonpecuniary injury
even in the absence of any evidence of pecuniary loss.
102. 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963). This case was decided under an ABA
Statute.
103. Id. at 430, 380 P.2d at 646, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
104. Id. at 437, 380 P.2d at 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
105. See id at 437, 380 P.2d at 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 11 ("injury consequent upon arrest, arraign-
ment, and imprisonment, although difficult to measure, is real enough").
106. 131 Cal. App. 2d 892, 281 P.2d 380 (1955).
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action for damages caused by the wrongful dishonor was an action in
tort.' °7 The issue in Abramowitz was whether the customer could re-
cover damages for the loss of the automobile. After discussing the law in
California prior to the adoption of the ABA Statute, the court held that
the statute entitled the customer to recover "only actual damage proved
to have been sustained as a result [of the wrongful dishonor]."' ' The
court also held, however, that the measure of damages in cases of wrong-
ful dishonor is prescribed by a separate statute for tort actions. 109 Under
that statute, tort damages include those that will compensate the plaintiff
for all injuries and losses "proximately caused" by the wrongful dis-
honor. The court concluded that the trial court was correct in finding
that the wrongful dishonor proximately caused the loss of the plaintiff's
automobile." 0 The court added that "it is difficult to conceive of a situa-
tion wherein a loss could be sustained more directly related to the dis-
honor of a check than that sustained by the plaintiff here." '' The
Abramowitz case illustrates that while the idea of actual damages under
the ABA Statute was developing as a distinct concept of damages re-
moved from the restrictions of common-law defamation, it was neverthe-
less closely related to issues of proof and causation.
B. Problems of Proof and Causation in Pre-Code Cases
The scope of a customer's recovery in pre-Code wrongful dishonor
cases depended not only upon the court's conception of damages, but
also upon the court's resolution of issues of proof and causation. A
court's approach to proof and causation depended largely upon whether
107. Id. at 895-86, 281 P.2d at 382-83.
108. It is clear that the court is not using the phrase "actual damage" to refer to the require-
ments of proof. If it were, then the word "proved" would be redundant. If we substitute the word
"proved," the passage would read: "the depositor is entitled to recover only proved damages that
have been proved."
109. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333 (Deering 1984) ("For the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is
the amount which compensates for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could
have been anticipated or not"). The court's use of this statute constituted a significant departure
from the restrictive contract approach that had been the law in California following Hartford v. All
Night and Day Bank, 170 Cal. 528, 150 P. 356 (1915), rev'd, Weaver v. Bank of America Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
110. 131 Cal. App. 2d at 896, 281 P.2d at 383. For a discussion of proximate cause in pre-Code
cases, see infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
111. 131 Cal. App. 2d at 896, 281 P.2d at 384.
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the court adhered to a contract or a tort theory of liability, and whether
it had adopted the Trader Rule.
The most fundamental question with respect to proof and causation in
pre-Code cases concerned the effect of the ABA Statute on the Trader
Rule. A review of the appellate cases decided under the ABA Statute
demonstrates that the courts did not interpret the statute in a uniform
manner. In fact, courts exhibited considerable disagreement over the
purpose and effect of the ABA Statute. In jurisdictions that adopted the
ABA Statute, courts generally curtailed the availability of the presump-
tion of damages under the Trader Rule and placed traders and non-
traders on an equal basis.1 12 This statement, however, must be qualified
in two important respects.
First, for some courts the restrictions on the availability of presumed
damages applied only in certain types of wrongful dishonor cases. In
Woody v. National Bank,113 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the ABA Statute did not apply because the plaintiff alleged that the dis-
honor was malicious. In addition, the court indicated it did "not appear
that the nonpayment of plaintiff's check was through mistake or error on
the part of defendant."' 4 In Jones v. Citizens Bank,115 the New Mexico
Supreme Court further narrowed the application of the ABA Statute by
holding that the plaintiff need not establish actual malice on the part of
the defendant to avoid the application of the statute.' 6 Legal malice, in
the sense of a wrongful act done intentionally and without just cause or
excuse, was sufficient. 11 7 It is difficult to tell how many courts adopted
the Jones approach because while some courts acknowledged that the
restrictions under the ABA Statute did not apply to malicious wrongful
dishonor, they failed to discuss whether the malice necessary to avoid the
statute was actual or merely legal malice.' 8 A review of the appellate
112. See, e.g., State Bank v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 260 S.W. 431 (1924); Allen v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943); Abramowitz v. Bank
of America, 131 Cal. 2d 892, 281 P.2d 380 (1955); Bush v. Southwark Nat'l Bank, 8 Pa. D. & C. 27
(1924).
113. 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927).
114. Id. at 556, 140 S.E. at 154.
115. 58 N.M. 48, 265 P.2d 366 (1954).
116. Id at 51, 265 P.2d at 368.
117. IdL
118. See, eg., Mouse v. Central Say. & Trust Co., 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929). See
also Weaver v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59 Cal. 2d 428, 435 n.9, 380 P.2d 644, 649
n.9, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 9 n.9 (1963) (stating that since it is improbable the customer will be able to
prove malicious dishonor, the court will address the impact of the statute on negligent dishonor). To
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cases decided under the ABA Statute demonstrates that although some
courts limited the statute's application to certain types of wrongful dis-
honors, at least as many applied the statute without apparent regard to
the type of dishonor. 19
Second, courts held that the purpose and effect of the ABA Statute
was to place traders and nontraders on an equal basis with respect to an
action for wrongful dishonor.1 20 Yet, the courts continued to classify the
customer as a trader or a nontrader' 2 ' and suggested that the distinction
had some significance. The distinction has no significance if, as the
courts suggested, the ABA Statute placed traders and nontraders on an
equal footing.
Other significant issues of proof arose in jurisdictions that had not
adopted the Trader Rule or had curtailed its presumption of damages.
The most significant issue was whether the wrongful dishonor was the
proximate cause of the subsequent arrest and prosecution of the cus-
tomer.122 A pre-ABA Statute case on this question was Hartford v. All
Night and Day Bank.12 3 In Hartford, the bank dishonored a check and
the holder proceeded to file a criminal complaint against the customer of
the bank. The customer was subsequently arrested. Although the
charges were ultimately dismissed, the customer alleged that the arrest
some extent, this ambiguity resulted from the language of the statute, which failed to specify whether
the customer must establish actual or merely legal malice to avoid the application of the restrictions
under the statute. One could safely assume that the drafters of the ABA Statute intended that the
restrictions apply to all wrongful dishonors unless accompanied by actual malice. Indeed, the word
"malice" would be rendered somewhat redundant if it is taken to mean legal malice. Nevertheless, it
is clear that not all courts interpreted it this way.
119. See cases cited supra note 112.
120. See State Bank v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 567, 260 S.W. 431, 432 (1924); Allen v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 58 Cal. App. 2d 124, 136 P.2d 345 (1943); Abramowitz v. Bank
of America, 131 Cal. 2d 892, 281 P.2d 380 (1955). This qualification, of course, would not be rele-
vant for those courts that had abolished the trader/nontrader distinction and made the presumption
of damages available to both. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
121. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank v. Ducros, 27 Ala. App. 193, 195, 168 So. 704, 705 (1936); State
Bank v. Marshall, 163 Ark. 566, 567, 260 S.W. 431, 432 (1924).
122. The other issues of proof and causation in pre-Code cases typically involve the foreseeabil-
ity of consequential harm to the customer in the absence of an arrest. For example, in Wahrman v.
County Trust Co., 246 A.D. 220,285 N.Y.S. 312 (1936), the court denied the customer's recovery of
special damages for the cancellatiow of an insurance policy on the grounds that the bank could not
foresee the cancellation simply from the fact that the check was payable to an insurance company.
Id. at 221, 285 N.Y.S. at 313. In Roe v. Best, 120 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), the court
reached the opposite conclusion on identical facts. Id. at 822.
123. 170 Cal. 538, 150 P. 356 (1915), rev'd, Weaver v. Bank of America Trust & Say. Ass'n, 59
Cal. 2d 428, 380 P.2d 644, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963).
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and detention resulted in mental suffering and injury to his reputation. 124
The California Supreme Court reversed the award of damages, in part
because it found that, as a matter of law, the injuries the plaintiff suffered
were not the proximate result of the dishonor. 125 The court found "no
direct causal connection" between the dishonor and the arrest. 126 In the
court's view, the independent and unforeseeable act of the holder, not the
bank's wrongful dishonor, caused the arrest of the plaintiff. 127
Other courts came to the same conclusion under the ABA Statute.'
28
These decisions essentially rest on a holding that the bank could not fore-
see the act of the holder in procuring the arrest of the customer. 29 This
holding is somewhat surprising given that issuing a check on insufficient
funds is a crime in most jurisdictions.' 30
Another line of cases, starting with Mouse v. Central Savings & Trust
Co.,' 31 rejected the Hartford position and reached the opposite conclu-
sion on the question of whether the bank could foresee the customer's
arrest.'32 Indeed, the California Supreme Court specifically overruled
Hartford in Weaver v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Association.1
33
124. 170 Cal. at 539, 150 P. at 356.
125. Id. at 541, 150 P. at 357.
126. Id.
127. It is surprising that this case became a leading case. The Hartford court all but concludes
that the dishonor was not wrongful. Id. The discussion on the proximate cause issue was at best
incidental, at worst dictum.
128. See, eg., Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie, 220 Mo. App. 165, 281 S.W. 130 (1926).
129. It is reasonable to suppose [that the holder] would immediately procure the arrest of
the plaintiff under such state of facts without some attempt, at least, to permit plaintiff to
make explanation or restitution? We answer no. . . . [W]e are unable to discover either
by reason or human experience how the act of [the holder] in causing plaintiff's arrest...
ought to have been expected to follow in the wake of defendant's [dishonor].
Id at 170, 281 S.W.2d at 132.
130. See Comment, The Measure of Damages, supra note 5, at 490.
131. 120 Ohio St. 599, 167 N.E. 868 (1929).
132. [I]t was entirely natural and probable that the act of the bank would result in the arrest
of Mouse. By the exercise of reasonable diligence, the bank could have foreseen that this
exact consequence would occur, for the issuance of a check upon a bank without funds or
credit to meet it is a public offense, which, notoriously, frequently results in the arrest and
imprisonment of the drawer of the check.
Id. at 605, 167 N.E. at 870. See also Collins v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 131 Conn. 167, 38 A.2d
582 (1944) (whether the wrongful dishonor was a proximate cause of the arrest was a question of fact
for the jury; the test is whether an ordinary person in the bank's position knew or should have
known of the probable harm). The issue of whether the wrongful dishonor of a customer's check
was the proximate cause of his arrest and prosecution has for the most part been resolved under
U.C.C. § 4-402. See infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
133. 59 Cal. 2d 428, 435, 380 P.2d 644, 649, 30 Cal. Rptr. 4, 9 (1963).
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III. DAMAGES AND PROOF IN CASES DECIDED UNDER U.C.C.
SECTION 4-402
The cases decided under the common law and the ABA Statute gener-
ated an array of difficult and important issues that confronted the draft-
ers of section 4-402. These issues included: 1) the nature of the action,
2) the appropriate classification of wrongful dishonors, 3) whether or not
the availability of damages and/or requirements of proof were dependent
upon the type of wrongful dishonor, 4) the scope of recovery in cases of
wrongful dishonor, 5) the causal connection the plaintiff must show be-
tween the dishonor and the injuries or losses for which compensation is
sought, and 6) the status of the Trader Rule. This Article has already
addressed the resolution of some of these issues under section 4-402 in
Parts I and 11.134 Part III will focus on the scope of recovery and the
nature of the proof required under section 4-402.
4. Damages Under Section 4-402
1. Damages in Cases of Mistaken Dishonor
The first sentence of section 4-402 appears to set forth a general rule of
liability: "A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proxi-
mately caused by the wrongful dishonor of an item."1 35 The second sen-
tence then provides that "[w]hen the dishonor occurs through mistake
liability is limited to actual damages proved." 136 Thus, like the ABA
Statute, section 4-402 utilizes the concept of mistaken dishonor. 137 When
a court finds the dishonor mistaken, one of the critical questions is what
injuries or losses the plaintiff may recover.
The scope of recovery in cases of wrongful dishonor was a major issue
at common law and under the ABA Statute. a13 This issue included the
question whether the customer could recover damages for arrest and
prosecution in such an action.' 39 Under the ABA Statute the specific
134. For a discussion of the issue of the nature of the action under § 4-402, see supra notes 6-47
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the classification of wrongful dishonors under § 4-402,
see supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
135. U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978).
136. U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978).
137. For a discussion of the concept of mistake in pre-Code cases, see supra notes 61-74 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the concept of mistake under section 4-402, see supra notes
76-81 and accompanying text.
138. For a discussion of the scope of the plaintiff's recovery at common law and under the ABA
Statute, see supra notes 83-111 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the question whether, under the common law and ABA Statute, a cus-
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problem often was determining the scope of recovery under the statutory
rubric of "actual damages." The language of section 4-402 addresses this
issue from the perspectives of damages and proof by providing that: "If
so proximately caused and proved damages may include damages for an
arrest and prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages.
Whether any consequential damages are proximately caused by the
wrongful dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case."140
These two sentences of section 4-402 specifically address the question of
damages for the arrest and prosecution of the customer and, for the most
part, have resolved the matter. 4 ' Prior to the enactment of section 4-
402, however, courts were just as troubled with questions involving the
recovery of damages for other kinds of injuries or losses that typically
resulted from the dishonor of a check. These included damages for per-
sonal humiliation, embarrassment, and damage to reputation in the ab-
sence of an arrest, as well as the recovery of damages for other types of
consequential harm, typically classified as special damages. 42 It would
seem that the third and fourth sentences of section 4-402 would have
settled many of these questions. The third sentence of section 4-402
states that damage "may include damages for an arrest or prosecution of
the customer or other consequential damages" if "proximately caused
and proved." 43 The fourth sentence specifies that proof of "any conse-
quential damages" is "a question of fact" in each case. 44 Except for
settling the issue of recovery of damages for arrest and prosecution of the
customer,1 45 however, section 4-402 has done disappointingly little to
settle the issues concerning these other types of damages.1 46 A review of
tomer could recover damages for an arrest and prosecution following a wrongful dishonor, see supra
notes 95-105, 122-33 and accompanying text.
140. Official Comment 5 to § 4-402 makes it clear that "decisions holding that as a matter of law
the dishonor of a check is not the 'proximate cause' of the arrest and prosecution of the customer"
are rejected. The issue is a question of fact to be decided on a case by case basis. See Johnson v.
Grant Square Bank & Trust Co., 634 P.2d 1324 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
141. See, eg., Johnson v. Grant Square Bank & Trust Co., 634 P.2d 1324 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
142. For discussions of the recovery of damages in pre-Code cases for various types of injuries
and losses in the absence of an arrest, see supra notes 17-24, 83-94, & 106-11 and accompanying text.
143. U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978).
144. U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978).
145. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. There is some question as to whether a cus-
tomer can recover for an arrest or prosecution as actual damages in cases where the dishonor is due
to mistake. This question is largely due to the failure of the third sentence of § 4-402 to specify that
actual damages may include damages for an arrest or prosecution of the customer.
146. The reasons for this are not certain, but most likely it is because pre-Code decisions still
influence some courts.
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the cases decided under section 4-402 demonstrates that courts have em-
braced an extremely wide array of views on the question of what injuries
or losses are recoverable in cases of mistaken dishonor.147
Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims14 and Harvey v. Michigan National
Bank 149 exemplify the narrow approach to the scope of recovery in cases
of mistaken dishonor under section 4-402. In Sims, the court upheld the
plaintiff's recovery of $1.50 for a telephone call, but disallowed the plain-
tiff's recovery of $500 for mental distress, embarrassment, and inconven-
ience, and $300 for two weeks of lost wages. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's dishonor of her two checks caused these injuries and
losses. The court pointed out that even though plaintiffs can recover
consequential damages as actual damages under section 4-402, they must
show that the consequential damages were "proximately caused by the
wrongful dishonor."15 Using a contract analogy, the court then stated
that "'proximately' caused damages, whether direct or consequential,
would be those which could be reasonably foreseeable by the parties as
the natural and probable result of the breach.""15 The court found that
because the plaintiff's mental distress and lost wages "bore no reasonable
relationship to the dishonor of her two checks," which presumably
means that the parties could not foresee these consequences, the plaintiff
147. As one court pointed out, "[t]he term 'actual damages' can, in the vernacular, present a can
of worms." Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 n.5 (D. Mass. 1982).
See also G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96-97 (1977) ("Statutory language-like any
other kind of language-almost always presents alternative possibilities of construction.").
The review of cases that follows is essentially a review of cases of mistaken dishonor. In a number
of cases, however, the courts neglect to specify whether the dishonor was mistaken. The review
includes the discussion of damages from some of these cases when it appears that the dishonor would
be classified as mistaken. Although this approach is undoubtedly troublesome for those who argue
that no distinction should be made between mistaken and nonmistaken dishonors, courts routinely,
though not uniformly, employ this distinction. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
Courts will probably continue to employ this distinction as long as § 4-402 retains its reference to
mistaken dishonors. Second, this review discusses what injuries or losses a consumer can recover
under the rubric of "actual damages" in § 4-402. The statute limits liability of the bank to actual
damages proved in cases of mistaken dishonor. Trying to determine what is compensable under the
phrase "actual damage" presents problems because some courts utilize different terminology when
discussing damages for a mistaken dishonor. Compare Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California
Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975) (proof of verifiable events) with Hooper v.
Bank of New Jersey, (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1369 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1980) (consequential damages). Moreover, some courts utilize the actual damage language
when discussing a case of nonmistaken dishonor. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
148. 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
149. 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Mich. Ct. C.P. 1974).
150. 435 S.W.2d at 57.
151. Id. at 58.
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could not recover them as actual damages. 152 The court in Sims did not
appear to take the position that this type of intangible injury5 3 and re-
sulting out-of-pocket losses are never recoverable as actual damages. The
court apparently based its denial of recovery on a failure of proof. Given
the court's requirements of proof and the failure of the plaintiff to satisfy
those requirements, this court is unlikely to allow recovery of this type of
consequential loss in a case of mistaken dishonor.1 54
In Harvey v. Michigan National Bank,1 55 the bank mistakenly dishon-
ored two of the plaintiff's checks issued to a mortgage company. The
mortgage company refused to accept subsequent checks from the plain-
tiff. A short time later, however, it resumed accepting the plaintiff's
checks after the defendant bank notified the mortgage company about
the errors. There was no evidence of any other denials of credit or evi-
dence that any other creditor or person had knowledge of the dishonor.
In Harvey, the court pointed out that because this dishonor was a mis-
take, section 4-402 limited the bank's liability to actual damages. The
language of the court's opinion suggests that actual damages include
damages for injury to the plaintiff's credit standing; however, the court
found that the plaintiff had not incurred any damages from a refusal to
extend credit. The plaintiff's actual damages included only returned
check charges, late charges and service charges imposed by the mortgage
company, and the cost of a money order. The court noted that the plain-
tiff could recover consequential damages,' 56 but added that damages for
mental distress are not recoverable as a matter of law even though the
court indicated that the evidence justified a finding that the plaintiff did
suffer some mental distress as a result of the dishonor.' 5 7
152. Id.
153. "Intangible" injury would include mental distress and embarrassment.
154. Language in the Sims opinion hints that a customer could recover for "loss of time" in
certain cases. Id. at 58. Commentators have criticized the Sims decision. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 675; Holland, supra note 4, at 532. The Sims opinion makes more sense
if one considers that, in the court's view, § 4-402 merely codifies the "common law measure of
damages as it heretofore existed in Kentucky." 435 S.W.2d at 58.
155. 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Mich. Ct. C.P. 1974).
156. Id. at 912.
157. The court's view that damages for mental distress are not recoverable as a matter of law is
an antiquated position of early cases. See supra notes 39-42, 91-94 and accompanying text. It also
conflicts with the fourth sentence of § 4-402. In support of this holding, the Harvey court cited 5A
MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING § 244 (3d ed. 1973), which contains the following statement:
A recovery for humiliation or embarrassment cannot be had where compensatory damages
only are allowed. The wrongful dishonor of a check will not justify such recovery unless
characterized by malice or oppression warranting punitive damages. Damages for mental
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Although the courts in Sims and Harvey deified recovery of most of
the damages sought by the plaintiffs, both opinions offer at least limited
support for the proposition that the scope of recovery in mistake cases
under section 4-402 encompasses consequential damages. Yet, in rela-
tion to the other cases on this issue, Sims and Harvey exemplify a narrow
approach to the scope of recovery in mistake cases. A substantial major-
ity of cases dealing with this issue take a much more expansive view.
Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank'58 exemplifies the expansive view. In
this case, the plaintiff had been a fish distributor who served several ho-
tels. The defendant wrongfully, but mistakenly, dishonored a check that
the plaintiff had written to its supplier of fish. The appellate court up-
held the trial court's finding that this dishonor "proximately caused"
plaintiff's supplier to terminate the credit and storage arrangement it had
with the plaintiff. This, in turn, made it impossible for the plaintiff to
continue the sales of fish to its customers. The appellate court upheld the
award of consequential damages, which included the annual loss of prof-
its projected over a three-year period.
In Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank,"5 9 the plaintiffs
claimed that the wrongful dishonor of their checks written to suppliers,
employees, and an insurance company resulted in severe damage to their
reputation, repeated threats of legal action by various creditors, criminal
and administrative investigations, the arrest of one plaintiff, repeated
threats of physical harm, acts of vandalism, severe mental and emotional
distress, marital problems, and substantial attorney's fees. In upholding
the trial court's finding that all of this harm was the "proximate conse-
quence" of the wrongful dishonors, the appellate court held that it was
foreseeable that the bank's dishonor of the plaintiff's checks would result
in these consequences." ° Following earlier cases decided under the
ABA Statute, 161 the court equated the term "actual damage" with the
broad concept of compensatory damages that encompasses mental and
emotional distress as well as injury to reputation. Because under the lan-
anguish or emotional disturbance suffered by a depositor as the result of the bank's
dishonoring a check drawn by him cannot be recovered as actual damages.
Id. at § 244. This statement misrepresents the law and disregards numerous cases decided under
§ 4.402. See infra notes 158-66, 173-80 and accompanying text.
158. 407 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1969).
159. 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1975).
160. Compare this court's holding with that of the Sims court. See supra text accompanying
notes 149-154.
161. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
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guage of section 4-402, a plaintiff may recover damages for mental and
emotional injuries incident to an arrest, the court found no reason to
disallow damages for the mental and emotional distress incident to the
other consequences of the wrongful dishonor experienced by the
plaintiffs.1
62
These cases represent the expansive view of the scope of recovery
under section 4-402 when a bank mistakenly dishonors a check. Typi-
cally, courts adopt the expansive view by broadly interpreting the "actual
damages" provision of section 4-402. 163 This view, which equates dam-
ages in mistaken dishonor cases with compensatory damages and in-
cludes consequential damages, originated in cases decided under the
ABA Statute 1" and finds support among commentators 165 and courts. 
166
162. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 957-58, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848, 851-54.
163. See supra note 147.
164. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
165. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 674-75; Davenport, supra note 4, at 1137-39;
Holland, supra note 4, at 526-29.
166. See, e-g., Hooper v. Bank of New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1369 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978).
The scope of recovery in cases of mistaken dishonor under the rubric of "actual damages" is of
critical importance, especially in light of the nearly universal denial of presumed damages in such
cases. See infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text. The most significant question is whether
consequential damages are recoverable as actual damages. The great weight of authority, both judi-
cial and scholarly, supports their recovery. If the customer is to have any meaningful remedy in
cases of mistaken dishonor, courts must make consequential damages available. All, or nearly all, of
the losses or injuries that follow from the wrongful dishonor of a customer's check are consequential
damages. The denial of consequential damages would mean the virtual denial of any recovery for
the customer.
Courts often contrast the term consequential damages with the term direct damages. The denial
of consequential damages therefore would limit the customer's recovery to direct damages. What
are the direct damages from the wrongful dishonor of a check? What injuries or losses would direct
damages compensate and how would courts measure such damages? The amount of the check
would not be useful. The concept of direct damages would not provide a customer with any mean-
ingful remedy if a court limited a customer's recovery to direct damages.
Courts also contrast the term consequential damages with general damages. If a court denies the
recovery of consequential damages in cases of mistaken dishonor, then does the court afford the
customer with a meaningful remedy by limiting the customer to general damages? General damages
do offer the possibility of a meaningful remedy, see infra notes 216-20 and accompanying text, but
there is a serious problem with courts' utilizing general damages in the context of mistaken wrongful
dishonors. General damages are essentially presumed damages. They are damages based on the loss
or injury that the law presumes to occur in all cases of a particular type. They do not represent the
loss or injury actually suffered by plaintiffs. See D. DOBBS, supra note 21, at 138-43. The problem is
that presumed damages are uniformly disallowed in cases of mistaken dishonor because of the lan-
guage of the second sentence of § 4-402 and Official Comment 3. See supra notes 190-94 and accom-
panying text. Therefore, it is unlikely that courts would allow the recovery of general damages in
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss2/3
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Because most courts embrace this expansive view of recovery by applying
"actual damage" in the comprehensive sense of compensatory damages
(including consequential damages), the question arises regarding the pur-
pose in the statutory scheme of the language of the second sentence of
section 4-402. In other words, if liability in mistaken dishonor cases is
limited to actual damages, a comprehensive conception of that term ne-
gates the effect of the limitation.
One common solution is to find that the purpose of the second sen-
tence of section 4-402 is to prohibit punitive damages in cases of mistaken
dishonor. 67 Under this view, the second sentence might read: when the
dishonor occurs through mistake, liability is limited to compensatory
damages proved, and punitive damages are prohibited.
Another solution, which also supports the expansive view of the scope
of recovery, follows from an analysis of the language of the statute and
its official comments. The ABA Statute introduced the phrase "actual
damage" into the law of wrongful dishonor. The courts viewed the stat-
ute from two distinct perspectives. One perspective limited the operation
of this language to matters of proof, which was consistent with the draft-
ers' intent. The other perspective, which also constituted a departure
from the common law, viewed the language as creating a distinct concept
of damages that would govern the scope of a customer's recovery, at least
such cases. There is, on the other band, precedent for allowing their recovery. For example, in the
context of broadcast defamation, courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover general damages even
under statutes limiting recovery to actual damages. See, eg., Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting
Corp., 251 So. 2d 405 (La. Ct. App. 1971). See also Johnson v. Department of Treasury, I.R.S., 700
F.2d 971, 983-986 (5th Cir. 1983).
The position taken by some courts in allowing the recovery of some types of consequential dam-
ages, but disallowing the recovery of others is unsupportable. For example, there is no justification
for allowing recovery for injury to credit standing but disallowing damages for mental pain and
suffering. See Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Mich. Ct.
C.P. 1974). This is nothing more than the common-law defamation rule, which was a product of an
early jurisdictional dispute. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Section 4-402 allows the
recovery of damages for the arrest and prosecution of the customer. This would include mental pain
and suffering accompanying the arrest and prosecution. Courts should allow for recovery of such
damages in the absence of an arrest and prosecution because the statute specifically allows the recov-
ery of "other consequential damages." The trend among the courts, in both mistake and nonmistake
cases, is to allow for the recovery of all consequential damages. See supra notes 161-66 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the scope of recovery in nonmistake cases, see infra notes 173-87
and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Hooper v. Bank of New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1369, 1375 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50
Cal. App. 3d 949, 958-59, 123 Cal. Rptr. 850, 854 (1975); Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md.
309, 315-16, 297 A.2d 758, 760-761 (1972). See also supra note 78.
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in cases of mistaken dishonor. 16' The drafters of section 4-402 based the
language of that section, in large part, on the ABA Statute, and the
phrase "actual damages" in section 4-402 is similarly subject to two dis-
tinct interpretations. The second sentence of section 4-402 gives rise to
two different interpretations-one emphasizing the term "actual dam-
ages" and the other emphasizing the word "proved." Most courts, fol-
lowing the first approach, interpret the language of the statute literally to
limit a bank's liability to actual damages. 169 The issue thus becomes one
of determining what injuries or losses come within the statutory language
of actual damages. Most courts follow an expansive approach.
The alternative view of the second sentence of section 4-402 empha-
sizes the word "proved" along with the word "actual." Under this view,
the sentence would read: When the dishonor occurs through mistake,
liability is limited to damages actually proved. Under this approach
courts limit damages with a requirement of proof. The language of Offi-
cial Comment 3 to section 4-402 supports this view. The Official Com-
ment states, in part, that "in all cases of dishonor by mistake damages
recoverable are limited to those actually proved." 170 In addition, the leg-
islative history of the ABA Statute, the statutory predecessor of section
4-402, reveals that the drafters' purpose was not to impose limitations on
the types of the compensable losses or injuries; rather, the purpose was to
prohibit the recovery of damages without proof.17 1 Under this approach,
the word "actual" refers to a matter of proof and not to types of damage.
It eliminates the Trader Rule presumption, but does not limit the types
of recoverable losses or injuries. Some recent appellate decisions utilize
this approach. 172
168. For a discussion of the two distinct interpretations of the phrase "actual damages" in the
ABA Statute, see supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
169. See Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 951, 123 Cal. Rptr.
848 (1975); Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906 (Mich. Ct. C.P.
1974); Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Shaw v. Union Bank
& Trust Co., 640 P.2d 953 (Okla. 1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978).
170. U.C.C. § 4-402, Official Comment 3 (1978).
171. For the legislative history of the ABA Statute, see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text.
172. See, e-g., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376-377 (5th Cir. 1980); Continental
Bank v. Fitting, 114 Ariz. 98, 100, 559 P.2d 218, 220 (1977); Clairmont v. State Bank, 295 N.W.2d
154, 158 (N.D. 1980).
On the other hand, several cases decided under § 4-402 suggest that the phrase "actual damages
proved" does limit the types of recoverable losses or injuries in a case of mistaken dishonor. See,
eg., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980); Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan
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2. Damages in Cases of Nonmistaken Dishonor
There is far less diversity of opinion among the courts on the issue of
damages when the dishonor was not a mistake17 3 than when it was a
mistake. An overwhelming majority of courts take a very expansive view
of the types of losses or injuries for which the customer may obtain com-
pensation in a case of nonmistaken dishonor. A wide array of specific
losses and injuries are compensable in this type of case. These include
seizure of property,174 threats of arrest or imprisonment,1 75 damage to or
destruction of credit standing, 176 damage to reputation, 177 mental and
emotional distress (including humiliation and embarrassment), 171 lost
time from employment or school (including compensation for lost wages
or income), 179 and loss of money or the use of money.180
Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Mass. 1982); Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 640 P.2d 953 (Okla.
1981). Unfortunately, these cases do not offer much guidance on the nature of the limitation because
they are not mistake cases. These courts typically point out that in a case of nonmistaken dishonor,
the bank is liable for "all damages proximately caused," and in a case of mistaken dishonor, the
bank's liability is limited to "actual damages." However, their discussion is limited to determining
what losses or injuries a customer may recover in nonmistake cases and does not address the nature
of the limitation imposed by the actual damage language in mistake cases. See infra notes 173-87
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the issue of proof in mistaken dishonor cases under § 4-
402, see infra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the issue of mistake, see supra notes 61-81 and accompanying text. See
also Yacht Club Sales & Service, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 623 P.2d 464 (1980);
Allison v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (N.M. Ct. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 85
N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1973). The great weight of authority would classify a bank's exercise of a
wrongful setoff against the customer's account as a nonmistaken dishonor. This Article will treat
any wrongful setoff case as nonmistaken dishonor. An intentional dishonor is a nonmistaken one;
however, some courts would place intentional dishonors involving some degree of malice in a third
category. See supra note 78.
174. See, eg., Allison v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 291, 511 P.2d 769, 774 (N.M. Ct. App.),
rev'don other grounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1973).
175. See, eg., 85 N.M. at 287-88, 511 P.2d at 773-74.
176. See, e-g., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 1980); Morse v. Mu-
tual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D. Mass. 1982); Farmers & Merchants State
Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex. 1981); Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d
718, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
177. See, eg., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 1980); Morse v. Mu-
tual Fed. Say. & Loan Ase'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D. Mass. 1982); Northshore Bank v. Palmer,
525 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
178. See, eg., Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D. Mass.
1982); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (rex. 1981); First
Nat'l Bank v. Hubbs, 566 S.W.2d 375, 378 (rex. Civ. App. 1978); Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525
S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
179. See, eg., American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839, 846 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1969); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (Tex. 1981);
Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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Courts classify these compensable losses or injuries as "damages proxi-
mately caused," a phrase found in the first sentence of section 4-402.18l
In this sense, the first sentence of section 4-402 does not set forth a gen-
eral rule of liability for cases of wrongful dishonor. Instead, it only gov-
erns the scope of recovery in nonmistake cases. Some courts, however,
emphasize the term "consequential damages," ' or "actual damages," 18 3
or "compensatory damages"1 14 when discussing what damages a cus-
tomer can recover in a case of nonmistaken dishonor.
The tendency of some courts to use these different terms when refer-
ring to essentially the same types of damage while other courts attach
different meanings to these words generates much of the confusion sur-
rounding section 4-402.185 In nonmistake cases, the courts typically use
the term "damages proximately caused" to describe the scope of recovery
available in nonmistake cases, and typically use the term "actual dam-
ages" to describe the scope of recovery available in mistake cases. In
most nonmistake cases, courts draw a distinction between these two
damage concepts. Each damage concept connotes a different scope of
recovery and each is available only in a particular type of wrongful dis-
honor case-either nonmistake or mistake. The courts in these nonmis-
take cases imply that "actual damages" entails some restrictions on the
types of losses or injuries that a customer could recover in mistake cases,
but courts rarely specify these restrictions.18 6 Instead, courts in nonmis-
take cases leave the general impression that the recovery in mistake cases
180. See. eg., Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921-22 (rex.
1981).
181. See Morse v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D. Mass. 1982);
Yacht Club Sales & Service, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 862, 623 P.2d 464, 474 (1980);
Joler v. Depositors Trust Co., 309 A.2d 871, 877 (Me. 1973); Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 640
P.2d 953, 956 (Okla. 1981); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918, 921
(Tex. 1981).
182. See Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 1980); Hooper v. Bank of
New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1369, 1374 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980); Allison v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 287-88, 511 P.2d 769, 773-74 (N.M. Ct. App.),
rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1973).
183. See Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 377 (5th Cir. 1980); Northshore Bank v.
Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
184. See, eg., Yacht Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 862, 623 P.2d
464, 474 (1980).
185. The courts' confusing and inconsistent use of terminology is the primary reason that any
effort to analyze the concept of "actual damage" will never be completely successful. The same can
be said about the concept of "mistake."
186. See, eg., Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 1980); Morse v. Mu-
tual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1279 (D. Mass. 1982).
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is somehow more restrictive than the scope of recovery in nonmistake
cases because damages in mistake cases are "limited to actual damages."
A review of the mistake cases, however, shows that a substantial majority
of courts in those cases embrace an expansive view of the allowable re-
covery under the rubric of "actual damages." '187 This view of actual
damages in mistake cases envisages a recovery that is essentially as ex-
pansive as the scope of recovery in the nonmistake cases in which the
courts employ the apparently more expansive concept of "damages proxi-
mately caused."
A comparison between the scope of recovery in mistake and in
nonmistake cases reveals a dichotomy between the views expressed by
the courts and the empirical reality. In nonmistake cases under section
4-402, courts employ an expansive view of the scope of recovery under
the "damages proximately caused" language while at the same time sug-
gesting that the scope of recovery in mistake cases is more restrictive. On
the other hand, the courts in mistake cases employ an expansive view of
the scope of recovery under the rubric of "actual damages" that is essen-
tially as expansive as the recovery allowed under the "damages proxi-
mately caused" language in nonmistake cases. At the same time, these
courts suggest that recovery in nonmistake cases is more expansive.
Thus, for a majority of courts, essentially no difference exists between the
scope of recovery under "actual damages" in mistake cases, and the
scope of recovery under "damages proximately caused" in nonmistake
cases. This is in spite of language in the courts' opinions that strongly
suggests there is such a difference.
The failure of courts to compare the scope of recovery in mistake cases
with that in nonmistake cases under section 4-402 causes this confusion.
The efforts of most courts in this respect do not go beyond a simple para-
phrase of the language of the statute. It is likely that courts confronted
with either a mistake or a nonmistake case do not expatiate on the scope
of recovery in the other type of case because the result would be dictum.
If there is essentially no difference between mistake cases and nonmis-
take cases with respect to the allowable scope of recovery, then the ques-
tion becomes whether the second sentence of section 4-402 has any
significance. The second sentence purports to limit the bank's liability in
cases of mistaken dishonor, but for a majority of courts this language
does not impose restrictions or limits on the scope of recovery in this
187. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
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type of case. This Article has already suggested two other possible mean-
ings for the limitation. First, the limitation in the second sentence of
section 4-402 can be seen as limiting the availability of punitive damages
to cases of nonmistaken dishonor.188 The other solution, which is com-
patible with the first, is that the second sentence of section 4-402 limits
the availability of a presumption of damages to cases of nonmistaken dis-
honor. In other words, when the dishonor occurs through mistake, sec-
tion 4-402 limits the bank's liability to proven compensatory damages
and abrogates any presumption of damages.189 Either of these interpre-
tations of the second sentence is consistent with the courts' views on the
parallel scope of recovery in mistake and nonmistake cases. The remain-
ing question is what differences, if any, exist between the requirements of
proof in mistaken and nonmistaken wrongful dishonor cases.
B. Proof Under Section 4-402
L Proof in Cases of Mistaken Dishonor
In determining the requirements of proof, courts almost uniformly
hold that, at least in cases of mistaken dishonor, section 4-402 abolished
the possibility of presumed damages under the Trader Rule.190 The
courts require proof of loss or injury and proof of a causal connection
between the mistaken dishonor and the plaintiff's losses or injuries. 191
Some courts also require the plaintiff to prove that the bank should have
been able to foresee the losses or injuries in some degree.' 92 The courts
most often utilize more general terminology requiring the plaintiff to
188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
190. See Continental Bank v. Fitting, 114 Ariz. App. 98, 100, 559 P.2d 218, 220 (1977); Yacht
Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 862, 623 P.2d 464, 474 (1980); Clair-
mont v. State Bank, 295 N.W.2d 154, 157-58 (N.D. 1980); Shaw v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 640
P.2d 953, 956 n.3 (Okla. 1981).
The official comments to § 4-402 support the notion that presumed damages under the Trader
Rule are not available in cases of mistaken dishonor. Official Comment 3 states that "[tihe
merchant, trader and fiduciary are placed on the same footing as any other drawer and in all cases of
dishonor by mistake damages recoverable are limited to those actually proved." U.C.C. § 4-402,
Official Comment 3 (1978).
191. See Charles Ragusa & Son v. Community State Bank, 360 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. Ct. App.
1978); Harvey v. Michigan Nat'l Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906, 909-910 (Mich. Ct.
C.P. 1974); National Pool Builders, Inc. v. Summit Nat'l Bank, 281 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Minn. 1979).
192. See, eg., Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 956, 123
Cal. Rptr. 848, 853 (1975); Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 435 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Ky. Ct. App.
1968).
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show the dishonor "proximately caused" the losses or injuries.t93 Never-
theless, a few appellate opinions suggest that some vestige of the Trader
Rule survives even in cases of mistaken dishonor.
194
2. Proof in Cases of Nonmistaken Dishonor
Courts in nonmistaken dishonor cases fundamentally disagree over the
requirements of proof. This dispute centers primarily on the status of the
Trader Rule under section 4-402.195 Some courts have adopted the view
that the enactment of section 4-402 abolished the Trader Rule, even in
cases of nonmistaken dishonor. For these courts, customers must prove
all damages because presumed damages under the rule are no longer
available in either a case of mistaken or nonmistaken dishonor. 196 How-
193. See Skov v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 407 F.2d 1318, 1319 (3d Cir. 1969); Hooper v. Bank of
New Jersey (In re Brandywine Assoc.), 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1369, 1369 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980); Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 951, 955, 123 Cal. Rptr.
848, 852 (1975); Charles Ragusa & Son v. Community State Bank, 360 So. 2d 231, 234 (La. Ct. App.
1978); Harvey v. Michigan Natl Bank, 19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 906, 912 (Mich. Ct. C.P.
1974); National Pool Builders, Inc. v. Summit Nat'l Bank, 281 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Minn. 1979); Shaw
v. Union Bank and Trust Co., 640 P.2d at 956 n.3 (Okla. 1981).
194. See, e.g., Loucks v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 746, 418 P.2d 191, 198-199
(1966) ("Damages recoverable for injuries to credit as a result of a wrongful dishonor are ... dam-
ages as would be fair and reasonable compensation for the injury which [the customer] must have
sustained. ... ); American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839, 845-46 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1970) (a "presumption" of harm arises upon the dishonor of a customer's business check,
but does not limit its availability to cases of nonmistaken dishonor). See also Holland, supra note 4,
at 523-26.
195. For a discussion of the Trader Rule at common law, see supra notes 36-53 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the status of the Trader Rule under the ABA Statute, see supra notes
112-21 and accompanying text.
196. For a discussion of the Trader Rule in mistake cases, see supra notes 190-94 and accompa-
nying text. Some courts have specifically held that the Trader Rule did not survive the enactment of
§ 4-402 in nonmistake cases. Yacht Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 623
P.2d 464, 472-75 (1980); Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 384 Mass. 310, 315, 424 N.E.2d 515, 520
(1981). See also Clairmont v. State Bank, 295 N.W.2d 154, 157-58 (N.D. 1980) (no "per se" dam-
ages for merchant). However, courts typically imply that § 4-402 abolished the Trader Rule by
specifying a general requirement of proof for all damages. This requirement includes both proof of
the injury and proof of the causal connection between the dishonor and the injury. See, ag., Charles
Ragusa & Son v. Community State Bank, 360 So. 2d 231 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Joler v. Depositors
Trust Co., 309 A.2d 871 (Me. 1973); National Pool Builders, Inc. v. Summit Natl Bank, 281
N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1979); Allison v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 511 P.2d 769 (N.M. Ct. App.
1973), rev'd on other ground 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1973); Luxonomy Cars, Inc. v. Citibank,
N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 951, 65 A.D.2d 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v.
Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1981).
Both positions on the status of the Trader Rule find considerable support in the language of Offi-
cial Comment 3 to § 4-402. It begins with the following unequivocal statement: "This section re-
jects decisions which have held that where the dishonored item has been drawn by a merchant,
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ever, some of these courts recognize the necessity of ameliorating the
requirements of proof regarding the amount of losses or injuries not read-
ily susceptible to exact proof.1
97
On the other hand, considerable authority supports the proposition
that section 4-402 merely narrowed the Trader Rule. Some courts hold
that section 4-402 eliminated the availability of per se damages only in
cases of mistaken dishonor, and that some form of a presumption re-
mains available to plaintiffs in cases of nonmistaken dishonor. For exam-
ple, in American Fletcher National Bank & Trust Company v. Flick,19
the court construed section 4-402 "to permit recovery of monetary com-
pensation for any actual or consequential harm, loss or injury proxi-
mately caused by a wrongful dishonor." 199 The court viewed the concept
of proximate cause in section 4-402 as a "statutory limitation" with re-
spect to the issue of proof of damages. Nevertheless, on the question of
the sufficiency of evidence when determining "whether a particular loss,
injury, or harm was proximately caused by a wrongful dishonor," the
court held:
When a bank wrongfully dishonors its customer's business check there
arises a presumption that the customer's credit and business standing is
thereby harmed. The function of this presumption is to remove from the
customer the duty of going forward with the evidence on this particular
injury or harm and thereby avoid a directed verdict against him if evidence
on the issue is not produced. The primary reason for the recognition of this
presumption is that a wrongful dishonor renders the existence of some harm
to the customer's credit and business standing so probable that it makes
legal sense as well as common sense to assume the existence of such harm
unless and until the adversary comes forward with some evidence to the
contrary.200
trader or fiduciary he is defamed in his business, trade or profession by a reflection on his credit and
hence that substantial damages may be awarded on the basis of defamation 'per se' without proof
that damage has occurred." U.C.C. § 4-402, Official Comment 3 (1978). The drafters then contra-
dict themselves by stating that "in all cases of dishonor by mistake damages recoverable are limited
to those actually proved." Id Obviously, each side in the Trader Rule controversy can find substan-
tial support for its position within this same comment. At least some commentators support the
view that the Trader Rule has not survived the enactment of § 4-402. See Daniels, supra note 5;
Davenport, supra note 4; Comment, Wrongful Dishonor of a Check Payor Bank's Liability Under
Section 4-402, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 116 (1969).
197. See, e.g., Yacht Club Sales & Serv., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 101 Idaho 852, 862, 623 P.2d
464, 474 (1980). See also Holland, supra note 58, at 525.
198. 252 N.E.2d 839 (Ind. App. 1969).
199. Id at 845.
200. Id at 845-46.
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In support of this presumption, the court relied upon pre-ABA Statute
cases that justified the Trader Rule by emphasizing the high probability
of damage to a customer's credit standing and business reputation from
even a single wrongful dishonor.2° ' The Flick court pointed out, how-
ever, that this presumption applies only to injury or damage to credit and
business standing and is not available to a customer with respect to other
consequential losses. A bank's wrongful dishonor may be the proximate
cause of consequential damages such as loss of income, but these dam-
ages are more susceptible to proof. Therefore, with these other types of
losses, the plaintiff must offer proof of the harm even though a court will
not require proof of the exact amount of the harm.20
In Flick, the court viewed the presumption as a statutory component
of section 4-402, consistent with the language of the statute, particularly
the phrase "damages proximately caused." In Elizarraras v. Bank of El
Paso,20 3 the Fifth Circuit viewed the presumption as a common-law rule
in holding that the Trader Rule survived the enactment of section 4-402.
In Elizarraras, the court found that the dishonor was not due to mis-
take.2z Because the dishonor was not "through mistake," the court held
that the statutory limitations found in section 4-402 simply did not ap-
ply. Instead, the court applied the common law, which included the
Trader Rule. Although the Trader Rule presumption was available to
the plaintiff, the court required the plaintiff to offer some evidence of the
business's size, past income, past use of credit, and future prospects in
order to reduce the jury's speculation. This idea of the limited applicabil-
ity of section 4-402 finds support in other cases.205
The view that section 4-402 eliminated the availability of presumed
damages only in cases of mistaken dishonor finds support from several
201. Schaffner v. Ehrman, 139 Ill. 109, 28 N.E. 917 (1891); Weiner v. North Penn Bank, Inc., 65
Pa. Super. 290 (1916). For a discussion of the rationale of presumed damages under the Trader
Rule, see supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
202. At least one authority has approved of the presumption suggested by the Flick court for
cases of nonmistaken dishonor. See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 670-74. Other
commentators have criticized the Flick opinion. See Davenport, supra note 4, at 1145-46; Holland,
supra note 4, at 522-23.
203. 631 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980).
204. Id. at 376-77.
205. For example, in Allison v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 N.M. 283, 287, 511 P.2d 769, 773 (N.M. Ct.
App.), rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.M. 511, 514 P.2d 30 (1973), the court stated that § 4-402 only
deals with "wrongful" dishonors and "mistaken" dishonors. A third and distinct type of dishonor,
namely an "intentional or willful or malicious" one, is not governed by the statute at all. Presuma-
bly the common law governs cases involving this type of dishonor. See supra note 78.
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sources. The second sentence of section 4-402 states that "[w]hen the
dishonor occurs through mistake liability is limited to actual damages
proved.'2 6 The "actual damages proved" language refers to proof; the
negative inference is that when the dishonor does not occur through mis-
take the statute does not so limit the bank's liability. The second sen-
tence of Official Comment 3 states that "in all cases of dishonor by
mistake damages recoverable are limited to those actually proved."
Although the first sentence of this same comment apparently contradicts
this statement, the inference again is that when the dishonor is other than
by mistake, section 4-402 does not limit the damages to those actually
proved. Moreover, the drafters of that section probably intended to re-
tain the availability of presumed damages in cases of nonmistaken dis-
honor.20 7 In general, courts justify the continued availability of the
Trader Rule presumption under section 4-402 on the same grounds that
courts used in the pre-Code period; namely, the high probability of dam-
age to or destruction of a customer's credit and business reputation from
even a single wrongful dishonor and the difficulties with respect to judi-
cial proof of these types of losses.208
Although the apparent weight of authority supports the view that the
Trader Rule did not survive the enactment of section 4-402, there is suffi-
cient authority to the contrary to call into question the current status of
the Trader Rule in the law of wrongful dishonor. Given the ambivalence
of the language of section 4-402 and the official comments 20 9 on the sta-
tus of the Trader Rule presumption, the merits of the rule itself should be
considered in the resolution of the issue. Under pre-Code law there were
compelling reasons for allowing both merchants and nonmerchants to
utilize the presumption under the Trader Rule. These reasons were
based on the realities of commerce, banking, and credit as well as a rec-
ognition of the limits of proof.210 Consider the following passage:
In the modem world the financial credit of a man, particularly of one en-
gaged in commercial pursuits, is a much prized and valuable asset.
Although laboriously built it is easily destroyed. The banks of the country,
206. U.C.C. § 4-402 (1978).
207. For a discussion on the drafting history of § 4-402, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 5, at 670-71.
208. See Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376 (5th Cir. 1980); American Fletcher
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839, 846 (Ind. App. 1969).
209. See supra note 196.
210. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Witter, 121 P.2d 414,418-19 (Ariz. 1942). For a discussion of the
rationale behind the development of the Trader Rule, see supra notes 36-53 and accompanying text.
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through which the great volume of our commercial business is transacted,
have a deserved reputation for accuracy and care in the conduct of their
affairs. Hence when a check of a depositor is refused at the counter of his
bank, that portion of the commercial world, greater or less, that comes
within the sphere of his transaction, promptly imputes the blame to him
rather than to the bank.21 1
The question is whether these conditions have been rectified with the
adoption of the U.C.C. Is the availability of credit more or less critical
today? Does the dishonor of an item today result in less or more harm to
the customer's credit standing? One commentator answered these ques-
tions as follows:
More than ever before, an individual's or an entity's credit rating is a key
to viable commercial relations. Modem business practices rely heavily
upon the use of credit to finance and to consummate purchases made by
businesses and consumers. Highly computerized credit ratings generally
dictate the amount of credit that can be extended to a potential purchaser.
Congress, by enacting the Fair Credit Reporting Act, (citations omitted)
recognized the importance of credit ratings and the need for their meticu-
lous accuracy. The Act is intended to maintain accuracy in credit reporting
and to provide remedies for abusive reporting practices ....
A sound credit rating can be impaired or even destroyed by the negotia-
tion of a check which is subsequently returned, stamped with the legend
"not sufficient funds" or "insufficient funds."2 12
The U.C.C. has not rectified these problems. In light of the importance
of credit and credit ratings in contemporary business practices, the rea-
sons for allowing the Trader Rule presumption are far more compelling
now than prior to the adoption of the U.C.C. Modem conditions require
the availability of presumed damages for injury to credit standing and
reputation, which inevitably results from the wrongful dishonor of a
check.
Even though an action for wrongful dishonor is no longer based upon
a common-law theory of defamation, but upon a theory of general tort
liability,2"' it retains many affinities with common-law defamation. The
harm wrought by a wrongful dishonor, like that wrought by defamation,
211. American Fletcher Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d 839, 846 (Ind. App. 1969)
(quoting Weiner v. North Penn Bank, Inc., 65 Pa. Super. 290 (1916)).
212. Daniels, supra note 5, at 803-04. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (a)-(t) (1982). For a discussion
of the importance of credit as evidenced by congressional enactment of the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982), see Brothers v. First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789, 793-95
(9th Cir. 1984).
213. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
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is often very subtle and indirect and thus not easily subject to monetary
proof.214 The availability of presumed damages in cases of wrongful dis-
honor is not a legal anomaly or anachronism. A great majority of courts
in this country still allow the recovery of substantial damages in certain
classes of defamation cases without proof of any injury or loss. 215
C. Resolving the Disputes Over Damages and Proof
L Presumed Damages As General Damages in Wrongful Dishonor
Cases
The availability of presumed damages in cases of wrongful dishonor
may be more acceptable in the broad context of general damages. In a
great many actions for damages, a plaintiff may recover damages that
generally or typically result from the particular wrong without having to
prove actual loss or injury.2 16 Courts assume that these general damages
measure the plaintiff's loss. Even though a particular legal injury has its
own rule of general damages, courts understand that the general damages
do not necessarily reflect the actual loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
In the case of most dignitary torts, compensation for emotional harm
to the plaintiff is included in general damages. A court will presume that
such harm exists.217 General damages represent an award for mental
and emotional harm as well as the affront to the plaintiff's dignity. In
defamation cases general damages include an estimate of the loss the
plaintiff has or will suffer under the circumstances.213 A plaintiff may
recover such damages even in the absence of proven pecuniary loss. 219
The concept of general damages should be employed in the context of
wrongful dishonor. In a case of wrongful dishonor the court should per-
mit the jury to award the customer substantial damages in the form of
214. For a discussion of fixing monetary damage, see Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188
N.W.2d 494 (1971).
215. See PROSSER, supra note 21, at 788-793 & 795-796. Prosser opines that proposals requiring
proof of actual damage in all cases of defamation "will probably never be adopted, because it is clear
that proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of the
defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has
resulted in fact." Id. at 765.
216. For a discussion of general damages, see D. DOBBS, supra note 21, at 138-40.
217. See id. at 139 & 528-31 (general damages in dignitary torts).
218. See Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (D. Pa. 1971); Dalton v.
Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 176, 188 N.W.2d 494, 497-98 (1971). For a discussion of general damages
in defamation cases, see D. DOBBS, supra note 21, at 513-14.
219. See Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., 251 So. 2d 405, 412 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
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general damages. This will result in compensation for loss and injury
that "generally" flows from the wrongful dishonor of a check, which the
plaintiff has very likely suffered or will suffer. Courts should allow gen-
eral damages without specific proof of emotional harm or actual pecuni-
ary loss. As in other types of cases, the amount of the jury's award
should be subject to a remittitur in cases of excessiveness.22°
2. Extent of Availability
a. Problems With the Unlimited Availability and Total Abolition
of Presumed Damages
The question remains as to whether these presumed damages or gen-
eral damages should be available in all cases of wrongful dishonor, or
only in cases of nonmistaken wrongful dishonor. The rationale for the
availability of presumed damages deals with the consequences that follow
from the dishonor of a customer's check. There is a high probability that
the dishonor will result in harm to the customer and the customer will
experience difficulty proving the harm.22' The consequences that follow
from a wrongful dishonor do not depend on whether that dishonor was
mistaken or nonmistaken. The bank's motivation behind the dishonor of
the check will typically have no bearing on the consequences of that dis-
honor with respect to the customer.222 Thus, the type of wrongful dis-
honor should have no bearing on the availability of the presumption.223
220. See, e.g., Thomas v. E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Whalen v.
Weaver, 464 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 177, 188
N.W.2d 494, 498 (1971).
The most frequent objection to the Trader Rule is that damage awards are out of proportion to
any actual injury suffered by the customer. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. As in
other legal contexts, the effective use of a remittitur can effectively solve this problem. Moreover, as
in the case of Elizarraras v. Bank of El Paso, 631 F.2d 366, 376-377 (5th Cir. 1980), the court could
require the plaintiff to offer some evidence of business size, past income, past use of credit, and future
prospects in order to reduce the jury's speculation. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 36-53, 210-12 and accompanying text.
222. It is true that in some instances the bank may mitigate the customer's damages. If the
dishonor was inadvertent and the bank pays the check when represented, the bank may write letters
of explanation and apology to the payee and other holders. But the dishonor, however, may have
already caused the customer injury and individuals other than the payee and holders may have
learned of the dishonor. Moreover, it may be economically advantageous for the holder to refuse to
represent the check and instead treat it as dishonored. More importantly, the bank would only
mitigate the customer's losses in the case of inadvertent dishonors. When the dishonor is intentional,
such as a wrongful setoff or hold, the bank would not be interested in minimizing the customer's
losses because the bank believes, albeit erroneously, that the dishonor was justified.
223. In other words, mistaken and nonmistaken dishonors should be treated the same, with
presumed damages available in both types of cases. Commentators who oppose the availability of
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This analysis must, however, be coupled with the statutory and judi-
cial background of the Trader Rule presumption. A line of cases decided
under the ABA Statute, the statutory predecessor of section 4-402, em-
ployed the mistake/nonmistake distinction in determining the availabil-
ity of presumed damages. 224 The language of section 4-402 employs the
concept of mistake, but mistake typically has no impact on the types of
injuries or losses for which the customer can recover damages.225 The
distinction in section 4-402 has only affected the requirements of proof in
mistake and nonmistake cases. While the courts generally agree that sec-
tion 4-402 abolished presumed damages in cases of mistaken dishonor,226
there is a reasonable disagreement among the courts and commentators
over the availability of presumed damages in cases of nonmistaken
dishonor.227
The issue of presumed damages under section 4-402 may be resolved in
a number of ways, none of which are totally satisfactory. Both of the
extreme positions, the total abolition of presumed damages and the un-
limited availability of presumed damages, are unworkable for a variety of
reasons. Most importantly, both positions are in direct conflict with the
express language of the second sentence of section 4-402.228 Both are
also in conflict with a portion of Official Comment 3 to section 4-402.229
Neither position finds support in the drafting history of section 4-402.230
Finally, neither position finds unequivocal support among the wrongful
dishonor cases decided under section 4_402.231
In-addition to these problems, the total abolition of presumed damages
is unacceptable as a matter of policy. It ignores the importance of credit
and credit ratings in contemporary business practices. It also ignores the
presumed damages also believe that mistaken and nonmistaken dishonors should be treated the
same, but for them presumed damages should be available in neither type of case. See, e.g., Daven-
port, supra note 4, at 1145.
224. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
228. The second sentence calls for some type of limitation in case of dishonor through mistake.
Because the limitation does not impact on the scope of the recovery it must impact on requirements
of proof if it is to have any significance.
229. The total abolition of presumed damages is in conflict with the second sentence of Official
Comment 3. The unlimited availability of presumed damages is in conflict with the first sentence.
230. The drafters probably intended to limit the availability of presumed damages to instances of
nonmistaken dishonor. See J. WrHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 670-71.
231. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
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limits of judicial proof with respect to the types of losses and injuries,
which are generally suffered in a case of wrongful dishonor.232 On the
other hand, the unlimited availability of presumed damages is desirable
as a matter of policy, because it accounts for the importance of credit
ratings and limits to judicial proof. These policy considerations, how-
ever, are insufficient to overcome the conflict with the language of the
statute and official comment as well as the courts' nearly uniform disal-
lowance of presumed damages in cases of mistaken wrongful dishonor.
b. A Compromise Approach to the Availability of Presumed
Damages
A compromise between the two extreme positions presents the most
reasonable approach to presumed damages. Courts should make avail-
able presumed damages to customers when the bank's dishonor is not a
mistake. The concept of mistake should be the one currently employed
by a majority of the courts under section 4-402.233 This position has the
support of at least some commentators234 and a minority of courts.23
Although the drafting history of section 4-402 is ambiguous, the drafters
intended this interpretation.236
This position conflicts with the first sentence of Official Comment 3 to
section 4-402. However, the two extreme positions are also in conflict
with that comment. This conflict is inevitable because the official com-
232. See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
233. For a discussion of the concept of mistake employed by the courts under § 4-402, see supra
notes 74-80 and accompanying text. Because the availability of presumed damages should depend
on whether the dishonor was mistaken or not the courts should endeavor to achieve a high degree of
uniformity on the interpretation of the term "mistake" in § 4-402.
234. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, .upra note 5, at 670-74.
235. See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 230. In his extensive criticism of the Trader Rule, William Davenport ar-
gues that the "rationale for the trader rule must apply in both [mistake and nonmistake cases] or in
neither ... " Davenport, supra note 4, at 1145. Treating both types of cases the same, he argues
that presumed damages should not be available in either type of case. Davenport criticizes Profes-
sors White and Summers for making a distinction between mistaken and nonmistaken dishonors
with respect to the availability of presumed damages. Id. at 1135-37. Davenport's criticism of the
White and Summers view fails to address the argument that perhaps most strongly supports that
view. Davenport points to the language of the statute and comments, but he virtually ignores the
legislative history of § 4-402. But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMER.S, supra note 5, at 671-72 n.73. Given
the ambiguity of the statute and the comments, the legislative history can hardly be ignored. The
legislative history strongly supports the distinction between mistaken and nonmistaken dishonors.
Davenport appears to be looking for logical consistency in a statute that, like its predecessor the
ABA Statute, is a product of compromise and expediency. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text. See also supra text accompanying note 208.
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ment contains two contradictory statements. Although this position has
the support of only a minority of courts, it is the only position that is
totally consistent with the second sentence of section 4-402. In addition,
the rationale behind the availability of presumed damages does not fully
support making presumed damages available only in cases of nonmis-
taken dishonor. This, however, is the nature of a compromise. It will
effectively minimize a substantial amount of the uncertainty and confu-
sion surrounding an action for wrongful dishonor. Until the drafters of
the U.C.C. amend section 4-402 and clarify the official comments, a com-
promise is probably the best solution.237
CONCLUSION
A customer's action against a bank for wrongful dishonor under
U.C.C. section 4-402 lies at the heart of the checking account relation-
ship, yet many of the important issues arising out of this type of action
remain unsettled. The two most significant issues concern the types of
losses or injuries for which the customer may obtain compensation in an
action for wrongful dishonor, and the nature of the proof required to
recover such damages. This Article has suggested several ways in which
courts can alleviate the uncertainties surrounding these issues and
achieve a greater measure of uniformity under the statute.
The first step is to achieve greater uniformity over the nature of the
action. Although today an overwhelming majority of courts have moved
toward a theory of tort liability, a few courts continue to view the action
as solely one of contract. Inasmuch as both classifications carry substan-
tial doctrinal baggage, this dichotomy has perpetuated unsettled substan-
tive issues with respect to damages and proof.
Second, the courts should clarify and unify the concept of mistake.
237. For recent commentary on the efforts by the Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C.
(P.E.B.) to revise Articles 3 and 4, see, Brandel & Geary, Electronic Fund Transfers and the New
Payments Code, 37 Bus. LAW. 1065 (1982); Brandel & Soloway, Electronic Fund Transfers and the
New Payments Code, 38 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1983); Miller, Report on the New Payments Code, 40 Bus,
LAW. 1139 (1985); Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus. LAW. 1215 (1984). One
product of this effort was the proposed Uniform New Payments Code (N.P.C.), drafted by the 3-4-8
Committee of the P.E.B.. In P.E.B. Draft No. 3 (1983) of the N.P.C., the 3-4-8 Committee proposed
a substantial revision of § 4-402. See generally Dow, Wrongful Dishonor of a Check Under Uniform
Commercial Code § 4-402 and Proposed New Payments Code § 101: A Comparison, paper presented
at the Midwest Business Law Ass'n Annual Meeting (April 4-6, 1984), reprinted in SELECTED PA-
PERS OF THE AM. Bus. LAW Ass'N REGIONAL PROCEEDINGS (Tri-State & Midwest Bus. Law
Ass'ns ) 32 (1984).
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Although most courts view a mistaken dishonor as limited to clerical and
other bookkeeping errors, the courts do not uniformly adhere to this
view, and some courts ignore the distinction altogether. While this lack
of uniformity has little significance with respect to the scope of losses or
injuries for which a customer may obtain compensation, a uniform con-
ception of mistake is essential with respect to the availability of both pre-
sumed damages and punitive damages.
There is considerable misunderstanding over the scope of the cus-
tomer's recovery in a case of wrongful dishonor. Courts typically suggest
that the scope of recovery in nonmistake cases under the "damages prox-
imately caused" language is more expansive than that in mistake cases
under the rubric of "actual damages," yet a comparison between these
two types of cases reveals a dichotomy between the views expressed by
the courts and empirical reality. For a majority of courts essentially no
difference exists in the scope of recovery between these two types of
cases. Nearly all courts allow an expansive recovery in cases of nonmis-
taken dishonor, and a substantial majority of courts allow the recovery of
all compensatory damages, including consequential damages, in a case of
mistaken dishonor. This expansive view of actual damages is justified on
several grounds, and is compatible with the second sentence of section 4-
402 if the language of that sentence is viewed as limiting the availability
of punitive damages or presumed damages.
Perhaps the most intractable problem in the law of wrongful dishonor
is the current status of the Trader Rule. Although courts agree that sec-
tion 4-402 abolished presumed damages in cases of mistaken dishonor,
there is fundamental disagreement among the courts and commentators
over the availability of presumed damages in cases of nonmistaken dis-
honor. This Article has argued that courts should afford the customer a
presumption of damages, but only in cases of nonmistaken wrongful dis-
honor. This represents a necessary compromise between the extreme po-
sitions calling for the unlimited availability of presumed damages on the
one hand, and their total abolition on the other. While this compromise
is not completely satisfactory, it is consistent with the language of section
4-402 and the drafters' intent. Until section 4-402 is amended, this ap-
proach will minimize a substantial amount of the uncertainty currently
surrounding an action for wrongful dishonor.
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